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ABSTRACT 
INNOVATE WITHIN PRODUCT LINES OR OUTSIDE OF THEM?   
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF CORPORATE INNOVATION IN A CORPORATE 
VENTURE MAKERSPACE 
Cole Joseph Crider 
April 9th, 2019 
Organizational forms that firms use for innovating include traditional R&D 
departments, corporate venturing, and open innovation. This dissertation examines a new 
form for corporate innovation—the corporate venture makerspace. Makerspaces are 
“shared production facilities,” and scholars suggest they are environments in which to 
create; yet few firms have adopted them as a means to innovate.  
This dissertation is an ethnographic study in which I examine why a large 
corporation with active R&D centers and limited resources also has a corporate venture 
makerspace as a secondary innovation mechanism when both organizations serve the same 
overarching function: explorative learning activities intended to generate innovative 
products that will increase the parent company’s profitability. Specifically, I ask in what 
ways does this organization implement its institutional logics into its organizational design, 
and what benefits or drawbacks, if any, result from its design. 
The reason why the organization ended up with a traditional R&D department and 
a corporate venture makerspace is because the makerspace was supposed to be a means to 
achieve more breakthrough innovations, but a historical process unfolded when product 
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successes required increased capabilities and resource spreading, generating increased 
pressures to adopt a different logic. Further, when products underperformed, additional 
logics, further increasing similarity, were incorporated to avoid future failure.  
The study contributes to the discussion of new product development within a 
corporate venture, demonstrating both intentional and unintentional ways innovation is 
enabled and constrained. The results suggest important practical implications for corporate 
venture managers, particularly ways in which initial innovation goals can be replaced when 
products succeed or fail. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the latter half of the 20th century, many U.S. manufacturing firms 
experienced newfound pressure from globalization, particularly in consumer products such 
as electronics, clothing, and appliances. Asian manufacturers were able to dramatically 
reduce the timeline from idea to product, forcing U.S. firms to rethink manufacturing 
practices. Whereas U.S. corporations can stifle innovative ideas, sometimes for years, 
South Korean companies like Samsung and LG whittle years into months, enabling quick 
idea-product cycles. U.S. behemoths respond differently. Some stay their course, lose 
market share, and fade into irrelevancy. Others innovate by investing in R&D centers, 
buying agile start-ups, or outsourcing innovation through licensing.  
Past research emphasizes the importance of innovation (Damanpour & 
Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 2) and, more specifically, new product development (NPD) for firm 
performance (Karakaya & Kobu, 1994; Robinson, 1990). Corporate innovation is “the 
development and use of new ideas or behaviors in organizations. A new idea could be a 
new product, service or method of production (technical innovation) or a new market, 
organizational structure or administrative system (administrative or organizational 
innovation)” (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 271). As a key component of corporate 
innovation, scholars contend, “product development is among the essential processes for 
success, survival, and renewal of organizations, particularly for firms in either fast-paced 
or competitive markets” (S. L. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995, p. 344).  
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Central to NPD is effective learning—what is learned, how it is learned, and how 
the knowledge learned is utilized (Kiss & Barr, 2017); companies construct processes and 
routines to manage the acquisition and dissemination of learned knowledge (Kiss & Barr, 
2017). For firms that need to innovate quickly, effective learning is especially critical. In 
their research, Kiss and Barr (2017) demonstrate that within turbulent industries, faster 
NPD implementation strategies were associated with higher firm performance; firms in 
less turbulent industries benefited from slower NPD strategy implementation speed.  
In an attempt to become more innovative, one U.S. manufacturing giant, crafted an 
unorthodox, entrepreneurial approach to innovation, NPD, and knowledge acquisition—
founding a corporate venture makerspace. The term “makerspace” can refer to everything 
from a single 3D printer in a repurposed food truck driving around to different city high 
schools to Microsoft’s The Garage, a space with 3D printers, CNC machines, soldering 
irons, and Arduino boards. Makerspaces are the most recent iteration of the Do-It-Yourself 
(DIY) culture (Anderson, 2012) generated by greater availability and access to advanced 
technologies. Barrett and colleagues note, “As the price of the technology associated with 
‘making,’ such as the cost of 3D printers, declined (Canessa, Fonda, Zennaro, & Deadline, 
2013),
 
it allowed for greater development of maker spaces, and the spaces began to spread 
into more locations” (Barrett et al., 2015, p. 2). Although the DIY movement may engender 
thoughts of improving existing products, “makers” include a much broader array of 
activities: “The term ‘maker’ is a more inclusive concept, referring not only to people who 
alter the work of others but also those who produce original work, conceptualizing and 
executing a project of their own design” (Aldrich, 2014, p. 2). For the purposes of this 
paper, Anderson’s (2012, p. 18) broad definition of makerspaces—“shared production 
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facilities”—is adopted. A corporate venture makerspace exists when a firm creates a 
makerspace as a distinct new venture subsidiary. 
I will call this U.S. manufacturing company, “Products Inc.”  Products Inc. employs 
more than 10,000 people, generating over $5 billion of annual revenue. Although the 
company operates multiple R&D centers, executive leadership created a corporate venture 
makerspace, which I give the pseudonym MakerHub. MakerHub’s founding purpose was 
to shorten the idea-product cycle by acting as a consumer-facing entity designed to enable 
a quicker feedback loop between engineers and consumers. Moreover, founding leadership 
envisioned new products being generated through community involvement—in other 
words, creating an open makerspace design where anyone might walk in and work on their 
own projects or co-create on a MakerHub product. Hence, MakerHub’s mission was to 
design, prototype, and sell innovative products by co-creating with the community.  
Makerspaces are environments in which to learn and create (Litts, 2015). However, 
as a corporate venture makerspace—Product Inc.’s creative attempt to increase its agility 
and decrease time from idea to product—MakerHub’s combination of corporate venture 
and makerspace faces singular challenges. First, at the time of MakerHub’s founding, 
Products Inc. was a public company. Thus, for Products Inc. to fulfill its fiduciary 
responsibility to shareholders, it must adequately justify founding a subsidiary whose 
primary function is to create and prototype innovative products, products which may or 
may not ever be profitable or even sold. Like many corporate ventures, MakerHub is tasked 
with being innovative, yet creativity is inherently messy and inefficient (O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2013), opening the door for shareholders to exert pressure on both Products Inc. 
and MakerHub to convert MakerHub into something more immediately profitable than a 
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creative space for tinkering and uninhibited creativity. Thus, MakerHub is faced with the 
daunting challenge of justifying its existence to both parent and shareholders while still 
fulfilling its mission of community innovation.  
MakerHub’s best strategy for surmounting this task of justifying its existence is 
through producing sellable products, thereby alleviating pressure from Products Inc.’s 
shareholders. In addition to producing sellable products, MakerHub also justifies its 
existence by using its community as a test group for Products Inc., helping determine which 
products may be more likely to succeed, subsequently reducing Products Inc.’s overall risk 
of launching an innovative product that later fails. And indeed, one of MakerHub’s stated 
goals is generating over ten new functional products every year to be sold either through 
Products Inc.’s commercial channels or through MakerHub’s own go-to-market strategies.  
In addition to the challenge of justifying its existence, MakerHub faces a related 
challenge—its combination of three stakeholders: stakeholders associated with Products 
Inc. (the parent company), stakeholders associated with MakerHub products (the venture), 
and stakeholders associated with MakerHub’s makerspace community (the makerspace). 
Research suggests makerspaces are environments where learning and creativity flourish 
(Litts, 2015)—thereby satisfying makerspace stakeholders. However, little research 
examines makerspaces as an effective means of innovating or increasing shareholder value. 
How corporate venture makerspaces are able to meet the needs of venture stakeholders (i.e. 
identify and develop novel products and capture market share), corporate parent 
stakeholders (i.e. generate profit and innovation), and community stakeholders (i.e. space 
to learn and create) is yet unknown.  
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A third challenge for MakerHub’s leadership is how best to allocate firm resources 
and employees’ time to satisfy each set of stakeholders. As both their consumer community 
and “maker” community grow, MakerHub is torn between competing demands, each with 
resource requirements. Employees are challenged with deciding which stakeholder groups 
to prioritize to. Further complications may arise from split loyalties among MakerHub’s 
employees. Although many came from Products Inc., several were hired outside of the 
parent company. Consequently, employees’ past experiences and backgrounds could 
influence how they interact with each stakeholder community.  
MakerHub is unique as I could find no other firms founded as a corporate venture 
makerspace and used as a means for new product development. Given the importance of 
firms continuously innovating, MakerHub offers an interesting context in which to 
understand how MakerHub differentiates itself from Products Inc.’s own R&D Centers, 
and consequently, what benefits, if any, MakerHub generates for Products Inc. One aspect 
of MakerHub’s intended uniqueness is its makerspace.  
Makerspace Research 
As noted above, makerspaces are the most recent iteration of the Do-It-Yourself 
(DIY) culture (Anderson, 2012), arising from heightened access to more advanced 
technologies. Makerspace definitions differ, with primary variation around how inclusive 
the term is. For instance, whereas some argue for a focus on engagement with physical 
artifacts, others state “makerspaces” encompass hackerspaces, fab labs, and co-working 
spaces (Colegrove, 2013). Although “hacking” may conjure notions of illegal activity, 
hackerspaces harken back to the label’s initial meaning—the idea of taking something 
apart, understanding how it works, and improving on it. Fab labs—short for fabrication 
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laboratories—were popularized by the MIT media labs and are environments in which 
physical artifacts can be quickly prototyped using machines such as laser cutters and 3D 
printers. Co-working spaces are utilized as places for professionals to work and for 
entrepreneurs serious about moving their hobby to an actual business (Colegrove, 2013; 
van Holm, 2014): “Coworking space is seen as an extension for individuals in hackerspaces 
that desire to move from a hobbyist to professional production of an item” (van Holm, 
2014, p. 6). Of hackerspaces, fab labs, and co-working spaces, Colegrove (2013) notes, 
“the common thread running through each is a focus on making rather than merely 
consuming” (p. 3).  
Makerspaces are generating substantial interest and attention. The White House 
hosted its first Maker Faire in 2014. The International Symposium on Academic 
Makerspaces held its first meeting at MIT in 2016. And many books are being published 
on makerspaces, emphasizing makerspaces as culturally transformative (Anderson, 2012; 
Hatch, 2013), makerspaces as learning environments (Peppler, Halverson, & Kafai, 
2016ab), and makerspace how-to books on building and running makerspaces in schools 
(Fleming, 2015; Provenzano, 2016). Much of the scholarly makerspace research similarly 
emphasizes learning and community within a number of environments, including libraries 
(Bowler, 2014), museums (Cavalcanti, 2013), K-12 schools (Oliver, 2016), and 
universities (Barrett et al., 2015). However, scholarly research is still relatively scant. Even 
among scholarly outlets, many articles heavily rely on popular press books for key insights 
(e.g., Hatch, 2013). Burgeoning research, however, helpfully articulates the philosophical 
underpinnings of makerspaces, including who interested stakeholders are and the 
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subsequent outcomes of makerspaces caused by the combination of environments, 
stakeholders, and participants.  
In the following articulation of makerspaces, I first discuss the philosophical 
underpinnings behind makerspaces, which, in addition to the popular press books, have 
driven much excitement among education professionals as a possible means of increasing 
learning outcomes and among community leaders as a means of improving science, 
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fluency in informal learning environments. 
Second, I attempt to create a coherent framework of past research, emphasizing how the 
combination of environments, stakeholders, and participants create unique outcomes.  
Philosophical Underpinnings of Makerspaces 
For the past half century, government funds directed toward education—K-12 and 
higher education—escalated, yet educational results remain underwhelming (Hanushek, 
1996). Although disagreement exists over effectiveness of total spending (Hedges & 
Greenwald, 1996), administrators, educators, and voters agree monies should be spent 
intentionally toward programs with measurable outcomes (Lips, Watkins, & Fleming, 
2008). Scholars began questioning teaching effectiveness and classroom outcomes, and 
during the 1980s, scholars argued for alternative learning approaches. Learning theories 
such as experiential learning theory (Kolb, 2014) and constructionism (Harel & Papert, 
1991) helped popularize interactive forms of teaching and learning. Rather than the 
widespread lecture-style model of teacher imparting information to passive students, 
experiential learning promotes student action—a model where students learn through trial 
and error, creativity, and acquiring information as they need it. This form of learning has 
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garnered positive results from both students and educators, generating increased interest in 
other forms of active student learning (Ito & Howe, 2016).  
Environments, Stakeholders, and Outcomes 
In many ways, the maker movement is antithetical to the structured, routine 
memorization of current K-12 curriculum, seeking instead to enable learners to engage 
with both technology and material, allowing the resources at hand to dictate what artifacts 
emerge. This process-centric approach emphasizes the individual rather than a specific 
learning outcome, causing a learner to “create their own goals and constraints and these 
evolve as their understanding and materials develop, and because the learners’ activities 
are based on their own goals and interests, they are more committed to their activity and 
find it to be fun and playful (Petrich, Wilkinson, & Bevan, 2013)” (Lacy, 2016, p. 16). 
Individuals within makerspaces can thus design and create according to their own interests. 
Consequently, informal learning environments such as museums (Cavalcanti, 2013) and 
libraries (Bowler, 2014) have blossomed. Notable examples of museums with makerspaces 
include the Exploratorium in San Francisco, New York Hall of Science, and the Children’s 
Museum in Pittsburgh. Further, one study found 17% of 162 public libraries sampled host 
maker events (Bertot, Real, Lee, McDermott, & Jaeger, 2015). 
Government stakeholders at both local and national levels are keenly interested in 
the long-term outcomes makerspaces may generate among children. One scholar notes 
many hope heightened interaction with makerspaces will lead to increased interest in 
STEM fields (Colegrove, 2013). For instance, one study examined how students’ familial 
backgrounds and past experiences with technology inform their activities within a 
makerspace (D. G. Davis, 2017). Another study examined what middle school students 
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from low socio-economic backgrounds created when charged with creating something 
targeting social issues (Lahana, 2016). 
Although less abundant, research has also examined makerspaces within schools 
(Cross, 2017; DeRosa, 2016; Lacy, 2016). Makerspaces within schools face a number of 
challenges, including resistance from colleagues unfamiliar with makerspace outcomes: 
“Educators outside of the Makerspace have the most trouble understanding the underlying 
purpose and pedagogy that supports the Makerspace” (Cross, 2017, p. 139) and trouble 
engaging both minority and female students (Lacy, 2016; Lahana, 2016). However, 
DeRosa’s (2016) study demonstrates makerspaces can be useful in formal learning 
environments. Students’ creativity confidence increased and all other learning outcomes 
met or succeeded “traditional objectives, except for expository writing” (DeRosa, 2016, p. 
149).  
Universities are a second formal environment in which makerspaces are becoming 
more prevalent in both the United States (Barrett et al., 2015) and Great Britain (Curry, 
2017), particularly within engineering schools. In a recent paper, Barrett and colleagues 
(2015) articulate how makerspaces potentially solve a growing problem within engineering 
schools. They bemoan many engineers leave universities possessing little experience 
working with tangible materials as much of their coursework is digitized (Barrett et al., 
2015). However, makerspaces enable hands-on learning, improving job readiness. In 
emphasizing the importance of makerspaces, Barrett et al. (2015, p. 3) write that connecting 
theory and practice through physical interaction with materials improves learning 
effectiveness: “Physical modeling and prototyping have been shown to increase the 
effectiveness and quality of the final design, and both play a key role in the development 
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of students by linking the material covered in the classroom to the real world.” Schools are 
realizing the benefits of makerspaces. Over 35 of the top 125 U.S. universities have 
makerspaces already (Barrett et al., 2015) further supporting the idea that makerspaces 
generate useful outcomes for adults as well as children.   
 Past research demonstrates ways in which makerspaces enable learning (Barrett et 
al., 2015; DeRosa, 2016; Lacy, 2016) and creativity (Petrich et al., 2013), while also 
recognizing potential constraints (Lacy, 2016; Lahana, 2016), such as stakeholder 
resistance (Cross, 2017). Learning and creativity are integral to innovation (Sawyer, 2011), 
and the next section discusses how several corporations attempt to foster innovation by 
incorporating makerspaces into their firms. I also consider makerspaces as a unique 
environment in which to respond to past calls for research that investigate opportunity 
development as it unfolds.  
Makerspaces and Entrepreneurship 
Although makerspaces are received with much enthusiasm in learning motivated 
contexts, corporations have been slow to use makerspaces given their inherent 
inefficiencies.1 As socially-oriented, creative learning environments, makerspaces are by 
nature inefficient, decreasing inherent attractiveness for cost-focused corporations. In his 
book, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Christensen contends large, successful corporations feel 
pressure to develop low risk products in order to maintain their current success; whereas, 
start-ups have little to lose, resulting in higher risk, innovative products. Because of the 
unattractiveness of makerspaces to many corporate giants, few corporate makerspaces 
                                                          
1There are several exceptions; tech firms such as Google, Microsoft, Autodesk, and 
Northrop Grumman have developed internal makerspaces in efforts to keep employees 
engaged and creative.  
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exist; therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, little empirical research examines corporate 
makerspaces.   
On the other hand, entrepreneurship scholars have made recent calls for makerspace 
research suggesting they may be environments brimming with interesting insights given 
their emphasis on creativity and prototyping (Browder, Aldrich, & Bradley, 2019). Their 
enthusiasm surrounds studying pre-firm activities during the idea-to-product process; 
generally, entrepreneurs navigating the pre-firm activities are difficult to find and 
subsequently difficult to study (Browder et al., 2019; Yang & Aldrich, 2017). Past research 
examines the entrepreneurial process through several lenses, including cognition (R. K. 
Mitchell et al., 2002; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005) and informational economics (Fiet, 
1996, 2007); however, how new venture ideas are fostered and developed is a confounding 
problem as most empirical studies rely on entrepreneurs’ memories of past events.  
A critical part of the entrepreneurial process is how opportunities are developed. 
Although entrepreneurship scholars disagree over the ontological nature of business 
opportunities (i.e. discovered, created, or imagined), scholars agree on the importance of 
studying the entrepreneurial process—the antecedents of opportunities, the process itself, 
and the sociological factors in which those occur (Davidsson, 2016). Opportunity 
development is the “process of shaping, discussion, and interpretation, whereby initial 
ideas are elaborated, refined, changed, or even discarded…this term represents both a 
dynamic, iterative, and a socially embedded view of how entrepreneurial opportunities 
reach their final form” (Dimov, 2007, p. 714). Dimov (2007) articulates the importance of 
examining opportunity development in light of time, environment, and competing forces: 
In order to systematically and rigorously study opportunity development, one needs 
to (1) capture its ephemeral beginning and fragile sustenance in order to avoid 
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survival bias, (2) reconcile the positivist and constructivist accounts of the nature 
of opportunities, and (3) incorporate the involvement of stakeholders beyond the 
individual entrepreneur (Davidsson, 2003; Dutta & Crossan, 2005; Gartner, Carter, 
& Hills, 2003). (Dimov, 2007, p. 714) 
 
This study is not of a pre-firm entrepreneur engaging in pre-firm activities; rather, it is of 
an entrepreneurial firm engaging in new product innovation—a related activity.  
MakerHub’s existence suggests the inefficiencies of a makerspace can be 
effectively managed with the demands of corporate shareholders. Thus, partly motivating 
the present study is the contention that MakerHub is a viable context in which to study new 
product innovations as they come to life while also incorporating a rich understanding of 
MakerHub’s three stakeholders: stakeholders associated with Products Inc., stakeholders 
associated with MakerHub as a start-up, and stakeholders associated with MakerHub as a 
makerspace. Each stakeholder group both enables and constrains how innovation occurs 
and manifests. Broadly, the study’s purpose is to understand how MakerHub differentiates 
itself from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers and how competing pressures impact its NPD 
processes.  
Theoretical Framework 
Products Inc.’s launching of a corporate venture makerspace is unusual, not only 
because most corporations appear to find the project unfeasible, but because Products Inc. 
is a giant, and giants think and act like other giants. When an organization participates in a 
single institutional logic or combines logics with complementary elements, it tends to look 
like other organizations because organizations mimic practices that are perceived to be 
legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, if an organization draws on multiple 
logics with competing prescriptions, the form that organization takes becomes more 
complex.  
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The institutional logics perspective is a meta-theory derived from and critical of 
neo-institutional theory. Broadly, neo-institutional theory argues firms tend to act and think 
like other firms they perceive as more successful or legitimate, imitating both structure and 
practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Friedland and Alford (1991), fathers of the 
institutional logics perspective, contested that neo-institutionalism discounted individual 
and firm agency, arguing firms and the individuals within enact change—firms within 
corporations and industries, and individuals within firms. To explain this enation and 
evolution, Friedland and Alford (1991) articulated how structure and agency interact, both 
impacting and being impacted by the other. Environmental factors shape firms’ and actors’ 
decisions (Martin, Currie, Weaver, Finn, & McDonald, 2017; Zhao & Lounsbury, 2016). 
Actors and firms shape environments (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012). Thornton and Ocasio (1999) define institutional logics as  
Socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, 
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality 
(p.804).  
 
Understanding how Products Inc. and MakerHub interact with the environment, 
with each other, and with stakeholders to generate innovative products is a difficult task 
because each is embedded in layers of historical patterns, which influence each entity’s 
self-perception, their perception of each other, and their perception of stakeholders’ needs. 
The institutional logics perspective is battle tested (Lounsbury & Beckman, 2015; 
Thornton, Ocasio, Greenwood, Oliver, & Suddaby, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012), 
generating much enlightening research. The present research seeks to add to past literature 
by studying MakerHub—a unique organizational that, on the surface, appears to challenge 
traditional assumptions about how corporations can innovate. The grand challenge of 
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explaining how and why organizations behave the way they do is at the heart of the 
institutional logics’ perspective. Through examining the existing contradiction that is 
MakerHub, this dissertation seeks to further understand how MakerHub innovates in a way 
that differentiates itself from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers by attending to the sets of logics 
driving both. Therefore, I explore the following two-part research question: In what ways 
does MakerHub implement its institutional logics into its organizational design? And what 
benefits, if any, is derived from its design? 
 
Intended Contribution 
This study contributes to institutional logics, entrepreneurship, and makerspace 
literatures in several ways. First, by observing how one corporate giant diverges from 
industry norms and pressures, fostering an agile start-up in the form of a corporate venture 
makerspace, I respond to recent calls for a bottom-up, micro-level perspective of how 
individuals and firms respond to competing institutional logics at multiple levels of 
analysis (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). More 
specifically, I contribute to the logics literature by articulating how individuals experience 
and enact the competing institutional logics inherent within their organization as they 
navigate through the NPD process.  
Although a few studies examine the micro-processes demonstrating firms’ and 
individuals’ responses to competing logics (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012), little is 
known about how individuals respond within new ventures. New ventures can experience 
rapid change as products succeed or fail, are adapted to consumer feedback, market forces, 
or environmental factors. This study provides additional data to the broader conversation 
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of how corporate ventures intentionally and unintentionally navigate competing pressures 
fostered by product outcomes and diverse stakeholders.  
MakerHub’s story contributes to our understanding (of the phenomenon) by 
demonstrating how success, necessity, failure, and an exogenous shock may interact to 
produce a new ordering of logics that differs from that at founding and more similar to 
what is familiar (e.g. Products Inc.’s R&D Centers). In this study, four logics are apparent 
within MakerHub and their competing prescriptions are demonstrated through the 
negotiations between and actions by employees and management. As MakerHub evolved, 
developed capabilities, and increased its bureaucracy, competing prescriptions generated a 
reordering of logics. However, all four logics remained as MakerHub continued to satisfy 
each of its distinct stakeholder groups.  
Second, by studying a corporate venture makerspace intended for creating and fast 
prototyping products, I contribute to the entrepreneurship literature on factors impacting 
innovation and NPD, thereby responding to scholars’ recent assertion that more 
ethnography research is needed in new venture processes. In the fall of 2017, 
entrepreneurship scholars assembled at Princeton University to discuss the need for 
research of nascent ventures. When I began observing in 2017, MakerHub was a four-year-
old enterprise and fit the “nascent venture” label. Moreover, as part of the innovation arm 
to a major appliance manufacturer, MakerHub is constantly developing new products—
specifically home appliances—generating new processes, and exploring new go-to-market 
strategies, enabling me to observe each of these in real-time. This study provides additional 
data to the conversation regarding what types of innovations corporate venture 
makerspaces actually generate and the impact open innovation has on their NPD processes. 
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Moreover, this study assists in fulfilling the need for more entrepreneurship ethnography 
by examining how stakeholders’ actions manifest themselves in both constraining and 
enabling ways in product ideation and realization processes.  
Third, past makerspace literature demonstrates the importance of intention on 
makerspace outcomes, whether that be access to a makerspace for children and the 
subsequent learning outcomes (Bowler, 2014; Cavalcanti, 2013; Litts, 2015) or the 
importance of interacting with tangible machines, tools, and materials for engineering 
students and subsequent job readiness (Barrett et al., 2015). Moreover, recent scholarship 
suggests corporate makerspaces may be a means of corporate innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Browder et al., 2019). By watching making occur in a corporate venture, 
I contribute to these relationships by discovering specific ways in which the makerspace 
enables innovation, particularly through “hacking” existing products and providing an 
environment conducive to developing new product ideas. Although this study’s 
makerspace is on the edges of a large university’s campus in the southern U.S., MakerHub 
is neither owned nor operated by the university. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical 
study of a wholly-owned subsidiary, corporate venture makerspace. Thus, this study 
contributes to current makerspace literature by also examining a new makerspace 
environment, subsequently creating a different mix of stakeholders engaged in 
MakerHub’s outcomes.  
Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters and appendices. In the present chapter 
(chapter 1), I tell the tale of MakerHub, relating the environmental factors which shaped 
its founding and the uniqueness of Products Inc.’s strategy in diverging from industry 
17 
 
norms in spawning MakerHub. Moreover, by highlighting current makerspace literature, I 
illustrate MakerHub’s distinctiveness as a rare combination of organizational types—a 
corporate venture makerspace. I also articulate the fitness of institutional logics as my 
theoretical lens through which I analyze MakerHub, its relationship with Products Inc., and 
each of their stakeholders. Further, I feature several of my study’s intended contributions.  
In chapter two, I discuss corporate venturing strategies to demonstrate the 
singularity of MakerHub as a means of corporate innovation. Moreover, I relate relevant 
institutional logics literature, attending specifically to how organizations and individuals 
make sense of and respond to complexity. In chapter three, I discuss my research method, 
data collection, and justifications for it, including past calls by both entrepreneurship and 
institutional logics scholars. Additionally, I express positionality. 
In chapter four, I highlight the study’s findings, relating how MakerHub evolved 
from its unique founding to functioning similarly to Products Inc.’s R&D Centers as it 
launched products (successful and unsuccessful), developed processes and practices, and 
encountered unexpected challenges. Moreover, I examine the benefits and drawbacks 
MakerHub offers to Products Inc. And in chapter five, I articulate the study’s contributions, 
practical implications, areas for future research, and limitations. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I discuss innovation and how institutional logics is a useful lens by 
which to study innovation. I begin in the first section by defining innovation and then 
highlighting past corporate innovation strategies. I attempt to demonstrate the various 
innovation problems firms experience, attending to innovation adoption versus generation, 
balancing exploitation and exploration, and open versus closed innovation strategies. 
Corporations navigate these tensions both intentionally and unintentionally, subsequently 
impacting innovation outcomes.  
In the second section, I introduce the institutional logics perspective, highlighting 
the four principles outlined by Thornton and colleagues (2012). Following Thornton et al. 
(2012), I ground this discussion in seminal institution theory papers. In the third section, I 
describe the evolution of the institutional logics perspective from Friedland and Alford’s 
(1991) influential chapter to more recent scholarship and further justify its use as the 
guiding lens behind this study. In the fourth section, I discuss institutional complexity, 
which has emerged as a major theme within the institutional logics perspective and 
functions as the phenomenological centerpiece of my dissertation.  
Corporate innovation approaches 
 
Of the 500 companies on Fortune Magazine’s maiden publication in 1955, only 
12% remain on the list. Once strongly held beliefs that innovation firmly resides in the test 
bed of large companies has been put to rest. Firms must innovate. Scholars warn, 
“Organizations operating under the present conditions of global competition, rapid 
technological advances, and resource scarcity must innovate in order to grow, to be 
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effective, and even to survive. Thus, fostering innovation remains a major challenge for 
business executives” (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 270).  
Innovation is an ambiguous term applied in many contexts in diverse ways. As 
defined earlier, corporate innovation is “the development and use of new ideas or behaviors 
in organizations. A new idea could be a new product, service or method of production 
(technical innovation) or a new market, organizational structure or administrative system 
(administrative or organizational innovation)” (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 271). 
How organizations approach the necessity of innovating differs, and some firms are better 
suited to acquire innovation rather than develop it internally.  
Damanpour and Wischnevsky’s (2006) typology of corporate innovation is a useful 
framework. Their typology is a two-by-two matrix, examining high and low levels of a 
firm’s innovation adoption and innovation generation (Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006). 
A firm high in both adoption and generation is labeled an “Innovative Organization.” A 
firm high in innovation adoption but low in innovation generation is labeled an 
“Innovation-adopting Organization.” A firm low in innovation adoption but high in 
innovation generation is labeled an “Innovation-generating Organization.” And a firm low 
in both categories is labeled “Non-innovative Organization” (p. 271).  
A further point important to delineate is the relationship between the level of 
innovation and what type of firm is likely to foster it. For example, in comparing innovation 
within large firms with entrepreneurial firms, Damanpour and Wischnevsky (2006) 
theorize whereas entrepreneurial firms or corporate ventures will more likely generate 
radical innovation, large corporations who will tend to foster incremental innovation 
(Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006).  
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Corporate Strategies 
Whereas corporate innovation is the artifact itself—the innovative product or 
process—corporate strategy is the specific mechanism by which that artifact comes about. 
Specifically, corporate strategy “refers to types of corporate innovation that represent 
different strategic opportunities for firms” (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002, 
p. 697). Corporate strategies include internal activities such as R&D spending, and new 
product development; and external activities include “acquisition of businesses that 
provide new products, processes, or markets” (Hoskisson et al., 2002, p. 697). Many factors 
may form firms’ corporate innovation strategies, including top management teams 
(Souitaris & Maestro, 2010), competition (Porter, 1979), technology (Bettis & Hitt, 1995), 
and environment (R. J. Mitchell, Shepherd, & Sharfman, 2011).  
In this section, I discuss different types of corporate innovation strategies. I first 
utilize March’s (1991) exploitation-exploration framework to relate the tensions firms 
experience as they seek to both exploit current assets and explore innovative opportunities. 
I also highlight corporate venturing as a form of exploration. Second, I review the recent 
strategy of engaging consumers in the development and creation of products as a means of 
capturing creativity developed by the crowd. I examine observed outcomes of open 
innovation and contend a corporate venture makerspace may be a useful solution to the 
problem of corporate innovation. 
Exploitation-Exploration   
In his fundamental work, March (1991) stated firms must balance between 
exploration and exploitation. Whereas exploitation concerns bettering a firm’s current 
processes through efficiency and execution, exploration focuses on “…things captured by 
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terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
innovation” (March, 1991, p. 71). March contends that firms must do both in order to 
ensure current and future success (March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). The 
question is how to manage both forms of firm actions as each require firm resources:  
As a result, organizations make explicit and implicit choices between the two . . . 
Processes for allocating resources between them, therefore, embody intertemporal, 
interinstitutional, and interpersonal comparisons, as well as risk preferences. The 
difficulties involved in making such comparisons lead to complications in 
specifying appropriate trade-offs, and in achieving them. (March, 1991, pp. 71-72) 
 
MakerHub was intentionally founded offsite from Products Inc.’s main facility as a means 
of distinguishing MakerHub’s explorative purpose. Moreover, although most MakerHub 
employees came from Products Inc., external hires were made, attempting to help foster 
cultural distinctions between parent and venture. An additional form of separation between 
Products Inc. and MakerHub is that MakerHub is a legal entity—a corporate venture. 
 One means of explorative learning is corporate venturing (Covin & Miles, 2007). 
Covin and Miles (2007) state corporate venturing (CV) “involves entrepreneurial efforts in 
which established business organizations invest in and/or create new business 
opportunities” (p. 183). In an empirical study of 15 corporations engaged in some form of 
corporate venturing, Covin and Miles (2007) find misalignments can occur between firms’ 
corporate venturing approach and their business strategies, resulting in ineffective value 
generating efforts (Covin & Miles, 2007). They find, 
Many firms employing CV never achieve nor sustain positive overall results 
through their venturing efforts. . . . Moreover, dozens of high-profile technology-
based companies . . . have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in new product 
development, yet have poor track records in new business development. Thus, 
while CV may be recognized as a potentially attractive management practice, it is 
not a managerial panacea. (p. 183) 
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CVs are mechanisms through which corporations like Products Inc. use to learn and 
innovate (Covin & Miles, 2007). However, corporations are starting to utilize other 
strategies to innovate. I next turn to a strategy MakerHub was built around: open 
innovation. 
Open Innovation and a Corporate Venture Makerspace 
 Open innovation is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of 
knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of 
innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, 2006b, p. 1). Open innovation skyrocketed into 
everyday parlance in the mid-2000s. Piloting its rise was Henry Chesbrough, author of two 
well cited books (2003, 2006b) and several papers on the topic (Chesbrough, 2006a, 2012). 
Chesbrough’s fundamental claim is that corporations’ former means of innovating—
primarily through R&D spending—may no longer be the best means of innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2012).  
In contrast to open innovation, Chesbrough (2003) states closed innovation 
revolves around firm control: “Companies must generate their own ideas that they would 
then develop, manufacture, market, distribute and service themselves” (p. 36). Innovation, 
the theory posits, resulted from spending the most on R&D, hiring the best people, and 
protecting the ideas produced through intellectual property thus garnering profits from a 
first mover advantage (Chesbrough, 2003). However, Chesbrough (2003) highlights 
several factors causing firms to rethink closed innovation, stating that among the key 
contributors are the increased ability for individuals to move and the availability in venture 
capital, enabling employees to take their ideas to potentially more enthusiastic investors if 
companies disparaged their inventions.  
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In contrast to closed innovation, Chesbrough (2003) describes an open innovation 
model as one in which  
firms commercialize external (as well as internal) ideas by deploying outside (as 
well as in-house) pathways to the market. Specifically, companies can 
commercialize internal ideas through channels outside of their current businesses 
in order to generate value for the organization. Some vehicles for accomplishing 
this include startup companies (which might be financed and staffed with some of 
the company’s own personnel) and licensing agreements. In addition, ideas can be 
brought inside for commercialization. In other words, the boundary between a firm 
and its surrounding environment is more porous, enabling innovation to move 
easily between the two. (p. 36-37) 
An adjacent part of open innovation is the idea of collaboration. Scholars extol the benefits 
of collaboration: “Collaboration can increase the value of creation by expanding the 
availability and use of relevant knowledge and other resources. Collaboration has been 
shown to reduce risk, speed products to market, decrease the cost of product development 
and process improvement and provide access to new markets and technologies” 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Fjeldstad, Snow, Miles, & Lettl, 2012, pp. 734-735).  
 However, open innovation is not a silver bullet for companies. Birkinshaw, 
Bouquet, and Barsoux (2011) warn companies are actually much better at internally 
generating innovative ideas than they are at selecting, developing, or diffusing those ideas. 
Moreover, they certify, “online tools, open innovation communities and big collaborative 
forums all have their limitations. None is always right or always wrong. The best approach 
involves careful judgment and a deep understanding of the particular challenges a company 
is facing” (Birkinshaw et al., 2011, p. 8). MakerHub engages in open innovation as a means 
to create, build, and sell new products; however, finding and engaging with the right kind 
of individuals—those who have both the technical expertise and the industry wherewithal 
to suggest a viable product—can be challenging as sorting through large quantities of well-
meaning but poorly thought out ideas is time consuming. 
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When discussing innovation, scholars often refer to corporations as the innovating 
entities, studying innovation at the firm level of analysis. However, it is not the corporation 
which actually innovates. Rather, innovation occurs through the dynamic interaction 
between factors at the individual, group, firm, field, and environmental levels of analysis. 
Entrepreneurship scholars emphasize many individual-level factors such as prior 
experience, education, and cognitive variables. Yet such studies rarely examine specific 
actions individuals take in response to pressures generated by professional, community, or 
corporate logics. To more fully understand how individuals and groups of individuals 
innovate, a nuanced understanding of their environment and how they interact—both 
individually and collectively—is needed. I next articulate the institutional logics 
perspective as a key lens through which to study innovation within MakerHub, a corporate 
venture makerspace.   
The Four Principles of the Institutional Logics Perspective 
In this section, I argue the institutional logics perspective is a suitable lens through 
which to study innovation and by which useful insights may be gleaned. I begin by 
highlighting its four key axioms: (a) the duality of structure and agency, (b) the material 
and symbolic aspects of institutions, (c) the historically contingent nature of institutions, 
and (d) the examination of institutions at multiple levels of analysis. Subsequently, I 
connect the formation of all four principles with how each inform a discussion on 
innovation and organizational design within a corporate venture makerspace. 
#1: Duality of structure and agency 
A central question institutional theory addresses is why firms behave the way they 
do. Much literature discussed this question over the past half-century, and indeed, is still 
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central within the institutional logics literature. A confounding problem exists, however, 
in explaining firm behavior: To what extent do firm managers control outcomes and to 
what extent do environmental or field level factors determine outcomes? Prior to Selznick’s 
(2011) seminal work, a dominant assumption in organization research was that firm 
managers act rationally and with the primary goal of maximizing shareholder value. If true, 
managerial agency would be driven by that singular motivation, and firm structures and 
processes would be solely focused on the same goal. However, Selznick (2011) disputes 
these assumptions, saying they lack explanatory power and misjudge human behavior. His 
empirical work demonstrates organizations have structures and processes which do not 
maximize shareholder value (Selznick, 1949, 2011).  
To adequately explain firm behavior, and subsequently how firms innovate, an 
understanding of diverse motivations and misaligned structures is needed. Selznick argues 
a dynamic relationship exists between agency, structure, and the environment, which 
causes firm institutionalization. He contends misaligned structures are a combination of 
institutionalization and mismanagement which occur over time (Selznick, 1996). As 
managerial motives inform firm decisions, structures constrain and enable the buffet of 
options available. In Selznick’s work, both arguments for structure and agency are clearly 
seen. However, precise mechanisms by which they interact or change are lacking. He does, 
however, maintain that managers should actively monitor and shape the relationship 
between institutions and firms and that if conflicts arise between those, they should be 
resolved (Thornton et al., 2012).   
Whereas Selznick gave agency to managers, Meyer and Rowan (1977), asking a 
different question—why do firms look similar?—emphasized structure over agency. 
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Meyer and Rowan (1977) highlight institutional rules, legitimacy, and isomorphism as 
means of explaining organizations’ similarities. They contend organizations conform to 
institutional rules as a means of gaining legitimacy, an essential necessary for firm survival 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional rules, they argue, are established primarily by the 
state and professions and are made known through myths and symbols. Their arguments 
emphasize structure and cultural conformity rather than rational decision making by 
managers. Zucker (1977) further solidified Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) arguments by 
stating that institutional rules—all socially constructed—generate organizational 
conformity because they are recognized as facts (Thornton et al., 2012), demonstrating that 
“institutionalization as driven by cognitive processes that lead to taken-for-granted 
understandings and behaviors” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 24).  
Zucker’s (1977) findings are important for two reasons. First, Zucker (1977) 
confirmed that the transmission of culture—a structural element—shapes behavior because 
perception of cultural can become rule-like. This argument substantiates a structural 
perspective of both managers’ decision making and firm behavior. Second, managers use 
cognitive processes—what Zucker sees as an agentic element—in rationalizing why they 
adhere to the cultural rules. Rationalization is defined as “theoretical assumptions about 
how actors make choices and take social action” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 29). The idea of 
rationalization is particularly relevant to the institutional logics perspective and will be 
unpacked in greater detail.  
Similar to Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) neo-
institutional theory also emphasizes structure over agency. However, they contend a 
different mechanism causes firm similarity. They assert isomorphism is driven by an 
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organization’s field structure rather than an adherence to culturally driven institutional 
rules. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also assume both the state and professions shape 
organizational fields and are thus integral in explaining isomorphism. They argue 
isomorphism tends to increase under many circumstances, including, but not limited to, 
heightened environmental uncertainty, strategic ambiguity, and the number and strength of 
ties between firms and professional organizations or governmental agencies (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Thornton et al., 2012). They highlight three types of isomorphism: mimetic, 
normative, and coercive. Whereas the first two concern adherence to structural forces, 
coercive isomorphism nods to agentive power (Thornton et al., 2012). However, this 
agency manifests itself primarily through strong-arm regulation, offering little explanatory 
richness to “agentive behavior” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; 
Thornton et al., 2012).  
 The outcome of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) article was the beginning of neo-
institutional theory. In distinguishing neo-institutional theory from “old” institutional 
theory, Selznick (1996) considers the importance of legitimacy: “Legitimacy is seen as an 
organizational ‘imperative’ that is both a source of inertia and a summons to justify 
particular forms and practices. The justifications encourage institutional mimicry or 
mimesis, meaning that the organization is highly sensitive to the cultural environment 
within which it lives” (Selznick, 1996, p. 273). However, DiMaggio’s (1988) paper 
highlights a fundamental problem within neo-institutional theory: it lacked explanatory 
mechanisms showing how institutions are created, reproduced, and dissolved (DiMaggio, 
1988; Thornton et al., 2012).  
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Attempting to address this problem and building on coercive isomorphism, 
DiMaggio (1988) theorizes institutions can be created and changed by institutional 
entrepreneurs, individuals who seek to better their own position by changing the “rules of 
the game.” They do so by shaping narratives and manipulating cultural symbols (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012). DiMaggio (1988) also theorizes that institutions are 
reproduced through “socializing new participants,” and delegitimized through 
hybridization (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 29).  
Although DiMaggio’s (1988) work helps expand institutional explanations, 
critiques suggest explanatory power is limited due to the reduced agency granted 
individuals and the lack of a deeper articulation of individual motives (Thornton et al., 
2012). Moreover, although institutional entrepreneurship is a mechanism by which 
individuals can alter institutions, scholars warn generalizing isolated instances may be 
detrimental to constructive theory building (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). Further, institutional 
entrepreneurship is inadequate to explain the relationship between an idea and the 
environment in which that idea emerges (Leca & Naccache, 2006; Thornton et al., 2012). 
Expanding on Simon’s (2013) notion of bounded rationality to explain how actors 
make choices, March and Olsen’s (2010) work returns to a focus on agency. They articulate 
two forms of rationality: logic of instrumentalism and logic of appropriateness. The former 
asks, “What are my interests in this situation?” and the latter asks, “What is expected of 
me in this situation?” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 30). March and Olsen’s (2010) conception 
of rationality is important because it generates further dialog about what external factors 
cause and legitimize behavior (Thornton et al., 2012). DiMaggio (1991) expounds on this 
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idea: “the meaning of rationality changes with changes in the context of institutional 
orders” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 31).  
To understand MakerHub’s unique organizational design as well as how, when, 
why, and what types of innovations occur within a corporate venture makerspace, both 
structure and agency considerations are critical. Without considering structure, an analysis 
of innovation processes would be merely regulated to a subset of cognitive variables—
while perhaps enlightening, certainly shallow. Conversely, an analysis solely of structure 
characteristics and their subsequent impact on innovation lacks explanatory power. Thus, 
the consideration of structure and agency broadens both the scope of activities and potential 
interpretations of individual, group, and firm actions. 
Understanding the tensions between structure and agency is particularly relevant to 
studying corporate venture makerspaces, because established corporations like Products 
Inc. tend to experience heightened pressure to conform to industry norms (Greenwood et 
al., 2011). On the other hand, as a nimble start-up on the fringes of an industry, theory 
would suggest MakerHub may be more immune to structural pressures, enabling increased 
agency in its decision-making ability. Such autonomy, however, may be diminished if 
Products Inc. artificially imposes institutional conformity on MakerHub. The existence and 
extent of such influences within this specific parent-venture relationship will be discussed. 
#2: The Material and Symbolic Aspects of Institutions 
The second principle of institutional logics understands institutions as both material 
and symbolic (Thornton et al., 2012). Thornton et al. (2012) clarify, “by material aspects 
of institutions, we refer to structures and practice; by symbolic aspects, we refer to ideation 
and meaning, recognizing that the symbolic and the material are intertwined and 
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constitutive of one another” (p. 10). An important distinction in the institutional logics 
perspective is the idea that material and symbolic elements inform artifacts dependent on 
which institutional order(s) drive rationalization (Thornton et al., 2012). Thornton (2004, 
p. 12) emphasizes six primary institutional orders: “the market, the corporation, the 
professions, the family, the religions, and the state.” Institutional orders contain “...unique 
organizing principles, practices, and symbols that influence individual and organizational 
behavior” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2). Understanding institutional order is critical because 
if the referent institutional order changes, the rationalization of individual actors will 
change leading to potentially dynamic relationships between actors, symbols, and 
materials. Moreover, as new individuals come into the firm and others leave, symbols may 
evolve depending on the ebb and flow of actors within the organization and their respective 
power. Moreover, cultural norms can generate differences between firms as symbols in one 
culture represent different meanings than in others.  
Neo-institutional theory acknowledges both the material and symbolic. Indeed, 
Selznick (1996) highlights the role of organizational myths and rituals within neo-
institutionalism stating, “The formal structure is institutionalized from without as well as 
from within, and it reflects prevailing concepts of how work should be organized. In 
postindustrial society, formal structures dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional 
environments instead of the demands of their work activities’” (Selznick, 1996, p. 273). 
Understanding interactions between the material and symbolic is an important 
differentiator of the institutional logics perspective (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). And, the 
institutional logics perspective assumes individuals, groups, firms, and industries 
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constantly engage with one or more institutional orders, influencing material and symbolic 
factors.  
Understanding how institutional logics manifest and inform both material and 
symbolic aspects of firms is important for a study of MakerHub. Innovation does not occur 
in a vacuum or solely in the mind of an individual. Forces constraining, enabling, and 
shaping individual, group, and firm actions all have their say on what, when, and how 
innovation occurs. Moreover, in watching the process of innovation occur, a framework is 
necessary to categorize related ideas, conversations, actions, artifacts, and processes to 
make sense of how they came about. At founding, MakerHub embraced both symbolic and 
material practices reflective of its unique organizational design. However, as MakerHub 
expanded its NPD activities, competing goals and resource constraints necessitated 
tradeoffs between practices, resulting in some becoming primarily symbolic.  
#3: The Historically Contingent Nature of Institutions 
The third principle of the institutional logics perspective shows the importance of 
examining firms within historical contexts. Thornton et al. (2012) elaborate, “Any true 
picture of social mechanisms must be observed not only across historical time, but also 
across multiple levels of analysis to capture the cross-level effects” (Thornton et al., 2012, 
p. 13). A strength of institutional logics is that the focus is on understanding the 
“…elemental parts of theory—the mechanisms (G. F. Davis & Marquis, 2005) that mediate 
between cause and effect and unfold over time” (Gross, 2009; Thornton et al., 2012, p. 13). 
The internet has transformed how entrepreneurs conduct market research, interact with 
consumers, and find new go-to-market strategies. While many sociological theories 
incorporate some aspect of historical contingency, management theories tend to emphasize 
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them less. Products Inc. was founded in the early 20th century, and many processes reflect 
hierarchical management strategies and formal firm-consumer relationships. Although 
many MakerHub employees were originally with Products Inc., MakerHub was founded 
with a flatter structure intending to generate innovation and increase external engagement 
(consumers, makers, etc.).  
#4: Examining Institutions at Multiple Levels of Analysis  
To understand firm behavior, researchers must examine problems at different levels 
of analysis and the mechanisms connecting and influencing each other across levels. The 
institutional logics perspective understands action within layers of constraints and 
pressures—an individual within an organization, an organization within a field, a field 
within a society. Again Thornton et al. (2012) certify, “The metatheory underlying the 
institutional logics perspective has grown around the concept of the interinstitutional 
system as it assumes that institutions operate at multiple levels of analysis with potential 
for cross-level interaction effects” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 14). 
This principle is relevant to the current study, as any examination of innovation 
within a corporate venture makerspace requires consideration of individual, group, firm, 
and field level factors. In the present study, firm, and individual levels are each salient as 
MakerHub experiences competing pressures externally (i.e. consumers, maker movement) 
and internally (i.e. Products Inc. and managerial decision making), fostering within its 
organizational design.  
Institutional Logics Perspective 
In this section, I highlight several of the key elements within the institutional logics 
perspective as it has evolved over the past 27 years. First, I discuss Friedland and Alford’s 
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(1991) work and the two subsequent articles that generated additional interest in the 
institutional logics perspective among researchers. Second, I note several of the early 
institutional logics papers, highlighting key findings and additions to the institutional logics 
perspective. Third, I conclude by noting the impact of external factors influencing firm 
performance.  
Development of the Institutional Logics Perspective 
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) conception of institutional logics gained little 
following until the late 1990s when two influential articles were published in the American 
Journal of Sociology: Haveman and Rao’s (1997) article on the evolution of the thrift 
industry from 1865-1928 and Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) article on how the publishing 
industry evolved from an editorial logic to a market logic. Haveman and Rao’s (1997) 
article, while not explicitly an institutional logics article, was influential as it demonstrated 
the impact socially constructed forces have on firms at multiple levels of analysis—social, 
field, and firm—and how firms evolved. Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) article focused on 
three mechanisms by which logics impact executive power: rules of prevailing logics, 
attention of logics, and assumptions of logics. The change in logics caused change in the 
determinants of executive succession (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Moreover, their article 
also highlights some of the material and symbolic aspects of institutional logics previously 
discussed.  
The early logics literature primarily focused on the antecedents to and 
consequences of field-level change, such as Thornton’s (2002) paper on the publishing 
industry and Lounsbury’s (2002) study of the finance industry. Scholars also began using 
an institutional perspective to research meso- and micro-level variables such as how 
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rhetoric can enact institutional change (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and how individual 
identity need not align with an incumbent logic or subsequent logic for change to occur 
(Lok, 2010). Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) also examined the relationship between 
changes in logics on individual identity. In a fascinating article on French cuisine, their 
narrative describes classic French cooking’s displacement by Nuevelle cooking. The 
authors find logics form behaviors, in part, through systems which reward conforming 
behavior and punish non-conformity, further demonstrating the usefulness of a logics 
perspective applied at lower levels of analysis.   
Forces Shaping Firm Behavior 
Before examining logics at the firm and individual level, a brief description of past 
research on macro-level effects is useful. A country’s cultural values and norms moderate 
the interaction between logics and firm behavior. For example, Ozen and Akkemik’s 
(2012) study demonstrates how logics converge with cultural norms at the nation-state 
level. They discuss the impact of nationalist logics on the perception of corporate behavior 
as legitimate or illegitimate, arguing legitimacy is gained through aligning corporate goals 
with nationalist goals (Özen & Akkemik, 2012, p. 523).  
Past research also features the importance of environmental munificence as a 
potential moderator between logics and firm behavior. Biniari, Simmons, Monsen, and 
Moreno (2015) examine the impact of resource dependence between parent and corporate 
venture, and their respective dependence on environmental munificence to predict which 
dominate corporate venture logic would be chosen. Relatedly, logics moderate network 
factors to shape firms’ ability to innovate and exploit structural holes (Vasudeva, Zaheer, 
& Hernandez, 2013).  
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This section has concerned general literature within the institutional logics 
perspective, demonstrating different applications of the perspective to explain phenomena 
at various levels of analysis and the dynamic links between logics and firms. In the next 
section, I turn to complexity—how firms engage with contrasting prescriptions between 
logics. As articulated, firms make tradeoffs in order to generate or adopt innovation. 
Further explanation as to how firms balance tensions between competing logics is needed. 
Complexity 
A critical research theme within the institutional logics literature is complexity. 
Complexity is “the simultaneous operation of different logics that impose contradictory 
demands on an organization” (Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016, p. 348). Greenwood and 
colleagues (2011, p. 317) state, “Organizations face institutional complexity whenever they 
confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics.” Institutional 
complexity is important because of both its prevalence within firms (Schildt & Perkmann, 
2017) and the unique outcomes complexity can cause for organizations and their members. 
First, I review why complexity is difficult to study and the need to understand the 
specificity of the logic itself. Second, I discuss organizational filters—organizational 
elements that impact how they perceive institutional logics and interact with them. Third, 
I focus on how organizations respond to complexity. Fourth, I discuss research studying 
the relationships between individuals and complexity.  
Complexity Analysis 
Institutional complexity is difficult to quantify yet perceptively understandable, 
difficult because a logic’s prescription may differ depending on the environment (Biniari 
et al., 2015), firm (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Amore, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2017), or 
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interpretation of the decision maker in power (Greenwood et al., 2011). Moreover, logics 
affect firms in varying degrees. For example, whereas centralized firms within a field 
network may face greater pressure to conform to logics’ prescriptions, firms less 
centralized in a field face fewer constraining pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, a firm may experience heterogeneity within a single logic (Sauermann & 
Stephan, 2013) as Jain and Sharma’s (2013) study of India’s telephony sector 
demonstrates; they identified three distinct market logics.  
Attempting to parse prescriptive elements between two competing logics, 
understand the degree to which they differ, and digest the subsequent impact those 
disagreements manifest themselves in firm and individual actions is daunting. Indeed, some 
scholars acknowledge the conception of an “idealistic logic,” while helpful in analyzing, 
lacks descriptive impact (Sauermann & Stephan, 2013), complicating analysis between 
logics’ distinct theoretical boundaries. Conversely, the existence of competing logics is 
observable and intuitive in organizations like universities and hospitals. Pressure to 
conform to professional practices and ethics competes with realizing budgetary needs. To 
best articulate relevant research, I heavily incorporate Greenwood et al.’s (2011) 
formulation of complexity, following their outline and marking recent adaptions to their 
framework. 
The manner in which complexity impacts organizations is in part due to the logics’ 
specificity (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). Highly specified logics have clear prescriptions 
for firms, constraining action and quickly punishing non-conforming firms (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). Moreover, the more specified the logics, the more 
pressure firms face to dissolve the complexity between logics. For example, two logics 
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with highly specific, competing prescriptions of firm behavior must be dissolved for 
tension within the firm to be alleviated, forcing firms to choose a dominant logic or create 
a hybrid logic (Greenwood et al., 2011). On the other hand, firms with ambiguous 
prescriptions have greater ability to innovate practices or structures with less fear of 
repercussions for nonconformity (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Organizational Filters  
Field Position: Greenwood et al. (2011) discuss the salient factors that filter how 
organizations experience and respond to complexity. The first factor discussed herein is 
field position (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 334). How centralized a firm is within a field 
alters the level of complexity it may experience (Greenwood et al., 2011). Scholars have 
argued that those on the edges of a field may experience less pressure to resolve potential 
complexity due to either an ignorance of expectations (Kraatz, 1998; Westphal, Gulati, & 
Shortell, 1997) or a lack of “social nudging and policing that reaffirms existing practices” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 341), potentially enabling more innovative behaviors. 
Conversely, those in the center of a field may face heightened pressure as visibility brings 
demands from competing factions with potentially competing logics (Greenwood et al., 
2011). However, if a firm is big enough, they may be beyond regulatory censure regardless 
of how central they are within an industry (Greenwood et al., 2011). Moreover, as 
complexity driven tensions increase, large firms may perceive complexity more clearly, 
enabling greater agency in how they choose to respond (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
Structure: How firms respond to institutionally complex environments is also 
informed by individual decision makers within a firm. Similar to Hambrick and Mason’s 
(1984) Upper Echelon’s Theory, firms respond to external environments through the 
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interpretive lens of those in positions to make decisions. Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 342) 
pen, “Institutional pressures do not just enter an organization—they are interpreted, given 
meaning and ‘represented’ by occupants of structural positions. It follows that the more 
differentiated and thus complex the organization, the greater the likelihood that it will 
experience institutional complexity.” In some ways, this concept harkens back to 
Selznick’s (2011) emphasis on a manager’s monitoring the institutionalization of a firm.  
Ownership and Governance: The third organizational filter moderating firms’ 
experience of complexity is ownership and governance. “Those in power most likely to 
determine organizational responses to multiple institutional logics—and, in a way that 
reflects their interests. In other words, appreciation and recognition of logics, and the 
choice of which logic to prioritize and how to do so, will be dictated by those with power” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 344). The corporate innovation literature discussed earlier, 
although not explicitly articulating complexity, substantiates the importance of ownership 
and governance. Owners inside the firm desired different innovation strategies than those 
owners outside the firm (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Shifts in logics due to changes in 
ownership is also seen in Bernstein’s article on innovation shifts within firms as they go 
through an IPO. Further, research on family firms’ experience with complexity also finds 
ownership and governance as critical (Miller et al., 2017). 
Identity: Lastly, identity shapes how organizations perceive and respond to 
institutional logics at two levels: the institutional level and the organizational level 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). The institutional level concerns the socially generated labels 
which grant legitimacy to firms who claim them and conform to their prescribe norms. 
Organizations tend to respond to complexity in ways consistent with the institutional labels 
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with which they have self-identified, necessarily enabling some actions while constraining 
others. Identity at the organizational level:  
is concerned with attributes that define the organization as different from other 
organizations—especially those sharing the same institutional category. At this 
level, identity has been shown to influence how expectations and pressures are 
prioritized; and, perhaps more so, it has been shown to shape which repertoires of 
possible responses are assessed and selected. (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 347) 
 
Discussing both institutional and organizational identities is important as they form a more 
holistic and nuanced understanding of how a firm perceives itself in relation to other firms, 
both as a part of and distinct from other firms (Kraatz & Block, 2008); those perceptions 
may be positive or negative, subsequently influencing behaviors differently (Greenwood 
et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Firms may adhere to different identities to various 
degrees: “The strength of an organizational identity is the extent to which it is deeply 
shared, and the stronger the identity the more it will condition an organization’s approach 
to institutional demands” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 348). 
Organizational Responses 
 
Research suggests organizations respond to institutional complexity through two 
means: strategies and structures (Greenwood et al., 2011). Within strategic responses, 
scholars contend firms generally respond in one of two ways. The first way is championed 
by Pache and Santos (2010), who examine the extent to which firms accept field-level 
norms and prescriptions, and study how “. . . logics are given voice within the organization” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 348). This approach contends firms respond to complexity by 
receiving logics into the firm and giving leverage to those logics best suited with firm goals. 
The second strategic response is highlighted by Kraatz and Block (2008), who 
assume more agency by firms and individuals within firms, stating organizations utilize 
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identity as a mechanism to respond in four different ways. First, firms may choose a 
dominant logic identity, reducing the emphasis of the competing logic identity. Mair, 
Mayer, and Lutz (2015) label this strategy as a conforming hybrid. For example, social 
enterprises, they argue, are inherently hybrids. Those that emphasize a social identity over 
a profit identity—or vice versa—are conforming to a specific hybrid (Mair et al., 2015). 
Second, firms may attempt to create shared meaning between identities in an effort to 
satisfy both (Binder, 2007). For example, in Mair and colleagues’ (2015) study of over 
seventy social enterprises, they found some firms innovate new governance structures and 
mechanisms, thereby conforming to neither logic. Third, firms may retain both identities 
and instead actively seek to minimize external conforming pressures (Smets et al., 2012). 
Fourth, firms may compartmentalize identities through “symbolic commitment to certain 
logics while preserving a core identity” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 350). This strategy 
Mair et al. (2015) label “selective decoupling” disclosing it enables firms to choose the 
best of both practices (See also Hamilton & Gioia, 2009).  
Firms can also strategically use the same institutional logic in multiple 
combinations. For example, Dalpiaz et al. (2016) examined Alessi, an Italian 
manufacturing firm, who combined the conflicting logics industrial manufacturing with 
cultural production. Over the course of three decades, Alessi used three distinct hybrid 
strategies, “imbu[ing] its products with new cultural meanings” (Dalpiaz et al., 2016, p. 
377). 
Organizations also respond to institutional complexity through structures of two 
types: blended and structurally differentiated. Blended structures seek to “combine and 
layer practices from different logics” with the intent of “achieving field legitimacy and the 
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positive benefits of both logics” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 352). Blending depends on 
both micro and macro level factors (Lo & Kennedy, 2014) and is particularly difficult as 
Battilana and Dorado (2010) demonstrate. In a study of two banks in South America, 
Battilana and Dorado (2010) contend there are two primary approaches to hybridization: 
apprenticeship and integration. Battilana and Dorado (2010) studied the hiring practices of 
both banks in order to better understand how management engaged with developmental 
and banking logics. One bank utilized the apprenticeship approach by hiring new 
employees with backgrounds in banking, causing friction between current employees with 
development backgrounds. Subsequently, the friction between the incumbent employees 
with a development logic and the incoming employees with banking logic caused 
operational problems. Executives were fired and growth substantially slowed. Conversely, 
the second bank employed an integration strategy. They hired recent graduates with 
allegiances to neither logic, enabling the bank to incorporate new employees into the hybrid 
logic itself.  
 Structural differentiation is the other type of structural response. Greenwood et al. 
(2011, p. 354) report firms responding with structural differentiation seek to separate logics 
into different subunits, “essentially partitioning and compartmentalizing an organization 
into different mindsets, normative orders, practices and processes.” A recent study (Miller 
et al., 2017) demonstrates the importance of structure in how family firms can capitalize 
on the strengths of market logic and family logic through a family firms’ governance 
structure. They argue the ability for firms to effectively capture the strengths of both 
depends on the level of family values within the community. The stronger the community’s 
family values the more likely a family firm will have a family governance structure. In an 
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environment with family dominant governance structures, they contend, family firms who 
increase market logic elements would create synergistic combinations of both the market 
and family logic (Miller et al., 2017). 
As a corporate venture makerspace, MakerHub provides a unique research domain 
because it creatively synthesizes in its design an institutionally complex blend of goals, 
needs, and logics. From Product Inc.’s corporate perspective, MakerHub must justify its 
existence. The two primary metrics established at MakerHub’s founding were to break-
even and to develop 12 never-seen-before products a year. Practically, then, MakerHub 
must both balance the demand to be innovative with the ability to generate profitable 
products. From a start-up perspective, MakerHub was also founded to be agile, ready to 
pivot to consumer demands, necessitating employees be comfortable in ambiguous roles. 
Lastly, from a makerspace perspective, the environment was founded to be conducive to 
creating, experimenting, and learning.   
Individual Responses  
Past research demonstrates the constraining and enabling influence of investors’ 
logics on young-firm innovation. One study found that among types of investors—VCs, 
corporations, and state funding agencies—state funding agency state logics constrained 
young firm innovation; whereas, VCs’ professional logics enabled innovation, and 
corporation logics fell between constraining and enabling (Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 
2015). However, parental logics may also be influential through individuals who were with 
the parent company but then transitioned to the new venture. In this section, I discuss the 
relationship between complexity and individuals, attending specifically to how individuals 
perceive, interact with, transform, and carry logics.  
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Individuals transport logics via four mechanisms:  artifacts, routines, symbolic 
systems, and relational systems (Pallas, Fredriksson, & Wedlin, 2016). Delbridge and 
Edwards (2013) apply Kraatz and Block’s (2008) emphasis on agency to the individual 
level: “Logics do not determine action precisely because the institutional sources of action 
are a relational feature of the actor position of individuals and their reflexive ability to 
recognize opportunities” (p. 7). In other words, the logics-individual relationship is a 
cyclical one where each constantly informs the other. While some argue individuals can 
only choose from the logics available to them (Martin et al., 2017), the buffet of options is 
dynamic rather than static.  
At both the individual and firm level, identity is also crucial. Among available 
logics, individuals can embrace multiple logics and their identities as long as those 
identities do not simultaneously become salient. Brandl and Bullinger (2017) demonstrate 
how the relationship between salience and identity impact individuals’ decisions to engage 
one logic over the other. Past literature tends to divide into two broad perspectives of 
logics’ impact on individual behavior, each based on distinct assumptions. The 
socialization perspective understands logics as external forces which in large part drive the 
thoughts and behaviors of the individual. Actors will choose specific logics based on their 
knowledge of a logic, the accessibility of a logic, and the practice or experience with a 
logic (Brandl & Bullinger, 2017). Conversely, the strategic perspective assumes actors 
have greater agency in disembedding themselves from the environment and strategically 
choosing what logics are most relevant to the situation. Brandl and Bullinger (2017) 
contend individual behavior is based on salient identities that are hierarchically ordered 
and chosen based on their importance to the individual. Utilizing identity control theory 
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(ICT), they maintain that if no conflict exists between logics, individuals can maintain 
association with both; however, when conflict occurs, individuals choose which is more 
important to them and may even actively dissociate themselves from the other logic.  
Understanding complexity at the individual level is challenging as complexity may 
occur within the minds of individuals even if not manifested in actual practices. Recent 
research demonstrates such a discrepancy can occur between firm logics and incoming 
employees’ perception of what the firm’s logics ought to be (Smith, Gillespie, Callan, 
Fitzsimmons, & Paulsen, 2017). And indeed, Products Inc.’s logics had (and continue to 
have) a profound impact on MakerHub’s processes, practices, and goals— both directly 
(firm level) and through individuals (individual level).  
MakerHub was founded with competing goals: 1) develop innovative products, 2) 
develop products quickly, and 3) develop products that are potentially profitable. Given 
the impact parental logics may have on a new venture and the various strategies employees 
may utilize to respond to those logics, I examine the ways in which MakerHub 
implemented its institutional logics into its organizational design to navigate these 
competing goals; the ways in which parental logics drew MakerHub to more closely imitate 
Products Inc.’s own R&D Centers; and the benefits, if any, MakerHub provides to Products 
Inc.  
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3. METHODS 
In this chapter, I discuss my potential biases and the philosophical assumptions of 
qualitative research. Then, I review my methodology, research context, data collection 
procedures, and data analysis procedures. Qualitative analysis emphasizes building theory 
by meaningfully engaging in the research context, providing readers “think descriptions” 
of both context and phenomena (Geertz, 1973).  
Philosophical Assumptions and Self-Reflexivity 
Any observation, interpretation, or synthesis of human action requires a lens 
through which to see, question, and understand. In this section, I will outline my biases and 
strategies for reducing potential influences on findings. Biases may arrive from past 
experiences or educational background, forming paradigms by which the world is 
perceived (Tracy, 2012). Paradigms are important to consider as they are “a basic set of 
beliefs that guide action” (Guba, 1990, p. 17). My undergraduate degree is in the 
Humanities, and both my graduate degrees (MBA and Ph.D.) are in business. My 
assumptions of the world, therefore, are formed by both, and I view both business and work 
as a means of human flourishing but not an end in and of themselves. In many ways, I am 
a post-positivist, but hesitate to fully align with any particular philosophy of science.  
Studying MakerHub was a unique experience for me because of my singularly non-
technical background. I did not participate in robotics or engineering-like programs 
growing up. Therefore, studying innovation in an environment dominated by engineers was 
both exciting and intimidating. I asked basic material, machine, and process questions of 
how and why things work the way they do. For example, when an intern made cutting 
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boards and deliberated types of wood to use, I asked about the benefits of various woods. 
He described how some where better for cleaning. On another occasion, I asked one 
MakerHub employee how extruders are made using a large machine MakerHub owns. He 
described the process and the different steps he went through to prepare the machine and 
how the machine worked.  
My lack of knowledge concerning all things “Making” was both an advantage and 
disadvantage. Positively, I asked many questions and did not assume I understood what 
was going on. The engineers at MakerHub became my teachers, and they seemed to enjoy 
educating me. This relationship was greatly beneficial as information and insights perhaps 
otherwise unknown surfaced. The disadvantage of my non-technical background was that 
I may have missed something. To truly appreciate something, a degree of knowledge about 
that thing is necessary.  
A second potential bias was my familiarity—albeit from a distance—of MakerHub 
before my research began. I took several tours of MakerHub’s facility before I ever 
considered research there. Moreover, MakerHub is lauded in both the community and 
university as a place for innovation, entrepreneurship, and community engagement. 
Therefore, I entered MakerHub’s environment expecting to find innovation occurring.  
Qualitative Design: Ethnography 
Qualitative methods have been heavily used in makerspace research (Cross, 2017; 
DeRosa, 2016; Lacy, 2016; Lahana, 2016; Litts, 2015), entrepreneurship research (Baker 
& Nelson, 2005; Lucas, Kerrick, Haugen, & Crider, 2016; Sarasvathy, 2001; Shane, 2000), 
innovation research (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), and 
institutional logics research (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Currie & Spyridonidis, 2016; 
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Dacin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010; Dalpiaz et al., 2016; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Smets et al., 
2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Indeed, over half of the articles on institutional logics 
use qualitative data (Reay & Jones, 2016). Using a qualitative methodology is particularly 
useful in these research streams because of the ability for researchers to examine contextual 
elements, examine individuals within their work environments and the interaction between 
individuals and their environments, and examine both intentional and unintentional actions 
and how those actions unfold over time. 
Benefits of Qualitative Approaches 
Qualitative approaches have a number of benefits. First, qualitative research 
emphasizes an organization’s everyday occurrences. Consequently, researchers’ 
viewpoints are formed through close relationship with the data, enabling descriptive 
pictures of organizational life (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). MakerHub’s 
employees work individually, work in teams, schedule meetings, engage in informal 
conversations, and constantly communicate about work and non-work issues. All these 
actions create meaning individually and collectively that inform how MakerHub innovates. 
Qualitative research is well suited to capture this type of data.  
Second, qualitative approaches also provide “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973), 
which “are vivid, are nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth that has a strong 
impact on the reader” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 11). Stimuli accost an individual’s brain 
constantly with sights, sounds, smells, tastes, many of which are immediately dismissed 
and forgotten. Humans tend to remember the abnormal rather than the everyday, 
“uninteresting” events. However, sometimes the uninteresting is important to how events 
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or processes unfold. Qualitative research is useful in catching some of these events that 
may otherwise be left out of a respondent’s recounting.  
Third, qualitative approaches are beneficial because studies are generally 
longitudinal: 
We can go far beyond snapshots of “what?” or “how many?” to just how and why 
things happen as they do—and even assess causation as it actually plays out in a 
particular setting. And the inherent flexibility of qualitative studies (data collection 
times and methods can vary as a study proceeds) gives further confidence that we 
really understand what is going on. (Miles et al., 2013, p. 11) 
 
Longitudinal studies enable researchers to find patterns as some events may decrease in 
importance or others become central to a study. Moreover, as events unfold, the focus of 
observations or questions can change, enabling a researcher to potentially shift focus as the 
data dictates.  
Lastly, qualitative approaches enable researchers to gain nuanced understanding of 
how individuals create and define meaning: “Qualitative data, with their emphasis on 
people’s lived experiences, are fundamentally well-suited for locating the meanings people 
place on the events, processes, and structures of their lives and for connecting these 
meanings to the social world around them” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 11). Relationships are a 
formidable factor in how individuals create meaning (B. Brown, 2015) and in how 
innovation occurs. In his book Explaining Creativity, Keith Sawyer warns against solely 
focusing on individuals in the search for understanding how and why innovation occurs 
(Sawyer, 2011). Rather, he emphasizes examining individuals within groups, teams, and 
environments to better explain outcomes.  
 
 
49 
 
Ethnography 
In this study, my data collection occurred in two phases: ethnography (via 
observation and participation) and semi-structured interviews. I begin this section by 
discussing ethnography. Ethnography is particularly useful for studying the creation, 
design, and prototyping of new products within a makerspace because the researcher is 
present as it occurs. Ethnography is an appropriate method to synthesize these multiple 
data sources: “Ethnographic methods tend toward the descriptive. The analysis task is to 
reach across multiple data sources and to condense them” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 8). Further, 
ethnography is particularly useful for understanding the everyday routines of employees 
(Van Maanen, 1979), how they make sense of the world around them, and their 
interpersonal relationships with others (Demetry, 2015). 
The decision to use ethnography was also formed by recent calls for more 
ethnographic research in entrepreneurship. In the fall of 2017, entrepreneurship scholars 
assembled at Princeton University to discuss the need for research of nascent ventures, 
particularly research using an ethnographic approach. MakerHub is a nascent venture and 
using ethnography to study how logics were implemented into its design, how innovation 
occurred, the tensions forming innovation, and the ways in which MakerHub innovates as 
distinct from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers contribute theoretically, practically, and 
methodologically. 
In the second phase of my study, I conducted semi-structured interviews of 
MakerHub employees (See Appendix A). By interviewing MakerHub employees, I gained 
further insights into specific questions concerning my research focus on how MakerHub 
incorporates its institutional logics into its organizational design in an effort to innovate 
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and contribute to Products Inc., enabling MakerHub employees to expound on what they 
see as critical to the innovation process, potential barriers to innovation, and how they “fit” 
within that process.  
Institutional logics scholars have also emphasized the need for further research on 
topics for which qualitative analysis is particularly useful. For example, questions such as 
those regarding the material aspects of culture (Ashraf, Ahmadsimab, & Pinkse, 2017), the 
process organizations use to systematically combine different logics (Dalpiaz et al., 2016), 
and how individuals internalize logics and the micro conditions under which institutional 
influences are carried to a greater or lesser degree into the practices of the organization 
(Almandoz, 2014). All these elements were part of understanding how MakerHub 
innovates. Given the prevalence of qualitative research within the entrepreneurship, 
institutional logics, and makerspace literatures as well as the calls for further research from 
a qualitative approach, I utilized ethnography and semi-structured interviews as a suitable 
means of studying MakerHub. 
Research Context 
As noted, the context in which this study took place is MakerHub—a corporate 
venture makerspace created in 2013 and owned by Products Inc. MakerHub’s founding 
purpose was to shorten the idea-product cycle by acting as an external-facing entity 
designed to enable a quicker feedback loop between engineers, makers, and consumers. 
Moreover, founding leadership envisioned new products being generated through 
community involvement—in other words, creating an open makerspace design where 
anyone might walk in and work on their own projects or co-create on a MakerHub product. 
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Hence, MakerHub’s stated mission (paraphrased) was to create, prototype, and test 
innovative products by co-creating with the community. 
Ideas for products come from MakerHub and Products Inc. employees, local 
stakeholders (i.e. those who come in and use MakerHub’s workplace), and the community. 
MakerHub employees discuss product ideas and suggest the best ideas to MakerHub’s 
leadership team. If the leadership team perceives the product idea has potential, one or 
more engineers may be assigned to work the technical feasibility of the product. Once the 
engineer(s) are confident the product is technically viable, market research is conducted to 
learn about potential interest among consumers. If there does seem to be a market for the 
product, additional members may be assigned to the project, including the industrial 
designer, additional engineers and commercial team members. As MakerHub’s engineers 
work through technical problems, they often file patents for which they are (if accepted) 
monetarily compensated by Products Inc.  
During the stages of idea development, technical problem solving, and customer 
research, the leadership team also considers the best go-to-market strategy. Past strategies 
MakerHub has used include selling through the parent (Products Inc.), crowdfunding 
through Indie-GoGo, or crowdfunding through MakerHub’s own website. Additionally, at 
any point during these activities or stages, a project may be discontinued due to a perceived 
lack of market interest, technical feasibility, operational feasibility, cost-price threshold, or 
lack of product consistency with MakerHub’s first adopter brand image.    
MakerHub has approximately 23 employees and consists of a commercial team 
(sales, marketing, and social media/brand), product developers (many of whom are 
mechanical engineers), product development technicians, designers, software engineers, an 
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office manager, and a product enthusiast. Approximately half of MakerHub’s employees 
have engineering backgrounds.   
MakerHub is located on the edge of a large Southern university in the United States 
and resides in a mid-sized city. University students benefit by having access to MakerHub, 
its equipment, and employees. Business, engineering, and design professors occasionally 
bring students to MakerHub for tours of MakerHub’s facilities. Moreover, MakerHub 
offers part-time work opportunities to students who can gain hands-on experience building 
first batch products in MakerHub’s micro-factory. The university provides benefit to 
MakerHub through the use of MakerHub’s building at a reduced rent.  
Data Collection Procedures 
Participant Recruitment 
When I began observations and participation in the fall of 2017, I informed 
MakerHub employees why I was there and asked if I might occasionally observe their 
actions and ask questions about them. All employees responded affirmatively and were 
very willing to accept both my presence in their environment and informal questions. The 
majority of data collected concerns MakerHub employees; however, I also collected data 
during a hackathon MakerHub held as well as interviewed non-MakerHub employees. 
Both hackathon participants and all interviewees I talked to were willing to be part of my 
data collection. 
Data Source and Observation Procedures 
In total, I visited MakerHub more than 160 times and spent over 600 hours there. 
Most of the hours I spent at MakerHub were between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. I also went there 
on Saturdays, as well as before and after the stated hours. My observations began 
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September 5, 2017 and continued through March of 2019. For the first several months of 
observations, I averaged 20 hours a week to saturate myself in the culture, processes and 
everyday actions of the people at MakerHub.  
During this time, I participated in a weekend hackathon at MakerHub; learned how 
to use the CAD software, Onshape, to make designs for MakerHub’s laser cutter that I 
then cut out; became acquainted with the basics of computer software, using an Arduino 
microcontroller; and cut foam board using a band-saw. Moreover, MakerHub employees 
showed me how to weld, make wooden cutting boards, and pan-sear steaks. 
While at MakerHub, I attempted to create some value for the company and 
employees as my presence and questions consumed time from employees’ tasks. Therefore, 
I attempted to engage in projects as a means of gaining deeper insights into MakerHub’s 
processes, creating value for MakerHub, and enabling relationship building with the 
employees there. I assisted with the creation, development, and analysis of customer 
surveys that were designed to capture interest in different products MakerHub was working 
on. I sat in on and participated in meetings which discussed timelines, product features, 
promotional campaigns, crowdfunding campaigns, and conference details. I accompanied 
MakerHub employees as they engaged with industry professionals, DIY enthusiasts, and 
consultants.  
At times, my activities at MakerHub were fast-paced and I jotted notes afterward. 
Other days allowed sufficient time to take notes while there, even clarifying questions 
about what was said or meant by statements or actions. The research analysis during this 
period was iterative. I frequently read through my data, writing memos to myself about 
potential themes that were emerging, and making notes about questions I had.   
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Interview Procedures 
I conducted 14 interviews using a semi-structured interview approach (See 
Appendix A). Of these 14 people, two were employed by MakerHub when I started my 
observations in the fall of 2017 but no longer work there as both were promoted to other 
positions within Products Inc. Ten of the interviews were in person and four were over 
the phone. I interviewed members of the executive team, commercial team (sales, 
marketing, and social media/brand), product developers (many of whom are mechanical 
engineers), and design team. I also interviewed the founder of a local non-profit, a maker 
who collaborated with MakerHub, and a city government official who interacts with 
MakerHub for various projects and events. In total, I amassed over 380 pages of double-
spaced notes and transcripts. 
Semi-structured interviews are a conversation between the researcher and the 
interviewee (Babbie, 2015). The researcher navigates the general direction of the 
conversations through planned questions, generated to address the study’s research 
questions. However, as the interviewee emphasizes particular points, the conversation may 
turn to other insightful topics (Haugen, 2015). My semi-structured questions (See 
Appendix A) revolved around how innovation occurs on day-to-day basis, tensions 
between types of activities (i.e. community, product development, sales), and the practices 
and processes which enable and constrain innovation.  
 Trust and rapport are important components to effective conversations between 
researchers and interviewees. Through my extensive time spent at MakerHub and the 
employees’ openness to my being there, both trust and rapport were built, which alleviated 
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potential timidity, anxiety, or awkwardness during interviews. Lastly, interviews were 
audio recorded to ensure accuracy. 
Data Analysis Procedures 
To analyze the data, I imitated past research using ethnography and causal loop 
diagramming methodology (Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002). This approach 
enabled an in-depth understanding of processes and actions over time and generated “…an 
explicitly dynamic and feedback-driven model” (Perlow et al., 2002, p. 932), which was 
important to answer in what ways MakerHub implemented its institutional logics in its 
organizational design and the benefits derived. The data analysis occurred in several stages. 
In the first stage, I wrote down observations and notes as I participated in the activities 
previously mentioned. I transcribed all field notes and observations myself, organizing the 
data and inputting it into the qualitative software, Atlas.ti. In the second stage, interviews 
were transcribed with the assistance of an artificial intelligence software. To ensure 
accuracy, I read through transcriptions while listening to the recordings. I then imported 
the transcriptions into Atlas.ti.  
In the third stage of my analysis, I read through all the material multiple times to 
saturate myself in the data, “gain(ing) a holistic understanding of the organization” 
(Milosevic, 2014, p. 45). I also drafted a description of MakerHub, attempting to articulate 
“what” before engaging in any interpretation of “why” or “how.” In the fourth stage, I 
engaged in descriptive open coding, which consisted of identifying specific occurrences in 
the data, relating to actions and processes. I then looked for themes around ways in which 
MakerHub implemented logics into their organizational design, ways in which MakerHub 
was enabled and constrained in their innovation processes, specific manifestations of logics 
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and ways in which logics generated tension, and the mechanisms by which MakerHub 
engaged with their stakeholders. Thematic analysis involves discerning patterns across data 
forms, going back and forth between my observation and participation notes, and 
interviews to create codes as themes emerge.  
Coding is critical to discovering themes across participants and data types and has 
been utilized by institutional logics scholars in past research (Currie & Spyridonidis, 2016; 
Thorén, Ågerfalk, & Rolandsson, 2017; Villani, Greco, & Phillips, 2017). Following the 
iterative analysis approach, I used descriptive first-level codes and analytic second-level 
codes (Tracy, 2012, p. 184). Tracy (2012, p. 184) describes iterative analysis as a “reflexive 
process in which the researcher visits and revisits the data, connects them to emerging 
insights, and progressively refines his/her focus and understandings (Srivastava & 
Hopwood, 2009).” I generated twenty-two descriptive codes and my end model consisted 
of nine dimensions derived from the data. 
Causal Loop Diagramming Method 
As I coded the data, it became clear that MakerHub’s continuous innovation 
processes were recursive and that MakerHub, designed to be unique, became increasingly 
similar to Products Inc.’s R&D Centers. Thus, in the fifth stage of my data analysis, a 
method enabling a holistic understanding was adopted to explain MakerHub’s evolution 
and recursive system. To do so, I constructed a dynamic model using the causal loop 
diagramming methodology (e.g. Sterman, 2000). Causal loop diagramming involves 
“…follow(ing) an iterative process of identifying links among categories and then 
returning to the data to confirm or disconfirm the links’ existence” (Perlow et al., 2002, p. 
934). 
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Dynamic models derived from ethnographic data can be useful in studying 
processes within social systems (Weick, 1979). For example, scholars studied the ways in 
which role changes within firms can delay benefits from new technology implementation 
(Black, Carlile, & Repenning, 2004). Others constructed a dynamic model from 
ethnographic data to study decision speed in startups (Perlow et al., 2002).  
Throughout the analysis process, I referred back to precedent literatures to ensure 
my findings contribute to scholarship. Further, to check the reliability, relevance, and 
meaningfulness of my conclusions to practitioners, I discussed findings with various 
MakerHub employees (Christians & Carey, 1989; Creswell & Miller, 2000). This process, 
generally referred to as member checking, is important to both establish the study’s 
reliability and validity and protect against misinterpretations.  
Validity and Reliability 
 I followed past research and recommended practices for validating and reliability 
procedures (Creswell & Poth, 2017; Milosevic, 2014). These included careful examination 
of personal biases, member checking, triangulation, and extended immersion in 
MakerHub’s environment.  
 Extensive participation and observation at MakerHub generated the core of my data 
collection; however, I also conducted semi-structured interviews intended to triangulate 
themes, which is critical to reliability: “The triangulation of data sources is critical as it 
enables  
collection of more accurate information and improves the robustness of the resulting  
findings” (Milosevic, 2014, p. 48). I also engaged in member checking to ensure my 
interpretations were accurate. These conversations proved invaluable in clarifying and 
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nuancing my understanding as well as generating additional insights previously unknown 
as employees brought up issues relevant to the study.   
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4. FINDINGS 
“I’m concerned we are becoming more and more like Products Inc., which I don’t 
like.”  
          ~MakerHub 
employee 
 
“Why are we wasting so much time and money creating 3D printed prototypes 
when we could just do renderings?”               ~former 
MakerHub employee 
 
“We don’t take big swings anymore. I’m embarrassed we even put that (pointing 
to a wall listing products) on our wall under current products. That’s not 
innovative!” 
          ~MakerHub 
employee 
Two Product Development Organizations 
At the Products Inc. Corporation, two organizations engage in new product 
development. The first is a traditional R&D unit housed within the parent company’s walls 
(Products Inc.). In this traditional R&D unit, each product line has an internal R&D team 
engaged in developing advanced technologies. Product line A has an internal R&D team 
A; Product line B has an internal R&D team B, and so on. Products Inc. executives then 
determine what technologies are potentially viable and assign New Product Introductions 
(NPIs) to project managers. The NPI process primarily consists of testing and design and 
follows a checklist of steps which must occur before the product can launch (e.g. be sold 
through various sales channels) (2017-10-4_O)2. NPIs may discontinue before launch due 
                                                          
2(Year-Month-Day: O-Observation, I-Interview)  
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to changes in executives’ priorities, project managers, design issues, or other testing 
problems (2017-10-12_O).  
The second organization engaged in innovation activities is Product Inc.’s 
corporate venture makerspace—MakerHub, housed in a separate location less than ten 
miles from Product Inc.’s headquarters. MakerHub’s purpose is to develop innovative 
technologies, ideate new product ideas, and validate those new products through diverse 
stakeholder engagement, small batch production, and sales. Although differences exist in 
both the precise mechanisms of innovating and the scope of stakeholders involved, the 
overarching function of both organizations is similar: explorative learning activities 
intended to generate innovative products to increase Products Inc.’s overall profitability. 
Consequently, each are evaluated based on their success enacting that function, which 
generate similar centralized decision making norms (2017-12-14_O).  
In the table below (See Table 1), grey rows represent similarities between 
MakerHub and Products Inc.’s R&D; white sections represent differences between them. 
As the table demonstrates, both use technology developed internally (either at Products 
Inc. or MakerHub), and the source for the most radical and innovative products also come 
from internal sources (Products Inc. engineers, MakerHub engineers). Moreover, 
MakerHub employees have articulated frustration over slow, centralized decision making, 
long product development timelines, lack of efficiency, and unnecessary processes, stating 
such actions remind them of how product development activities are conducted at Products 
Inc. (2017-10-19_O). At MakerHub, the end goals (explorative innovation) are 
accomplished primarily by internal knowledge capital (Products Inc. and MakerHub 
engineers). Thus, to adequately answer the research question—In what ways does 
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MakerHub implement its institutional logics into its organizational design and what 
benefits, if any, does MakerHub derive from its design—answering why an organization 
with limited resources ends up with two R&D organizations is important.  
Therefore, to answer these questions, we must first understand why Products Inc. 
created MakerHub and how it was intended to be different. I describe this in the first section 
of the chapter by discussing how MakerHub was intentionally created to be a distinct 
organizational form. Once it is clear why it was created and how it was supposed to be 
different, I then explain how it came to be similar to the R&D unit in Products Inc. in seven 
stages:  1) Environmental Forces and MakerHub’s Founding, 2) Product 1 and “Can we 
sell?”, 3) Expanding Customer Segments, 4) Success and Bureaucracy, and 5) Failure and 
Learning, 6) Identity Crisis, and 7) New Division. I describe each of these phases in order. 
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Table 1: Current Similarities (grey) and Differences (white) Between Products Inc. R&D and 
MakerHub 
  MakerHub Products Inc. R&D 
Stated Purpose  
▪ Quickly ideate, build, and validate 
innovative product ideas through 
engagement with external makers 
• Produce innovative technology relevant 
to product lines  
Actual Purpose 
▪ Develop innovation technology 
▪ Build, design, and validate new 
product ideas 
• Develop innovative technology that 
could eventually go into new products 
Product 
Development 
Timeline 
▪ “We aren’t fast enough!”  
▪ “The process is inefficient and too 
long”  
• “It can take years for a product to see the 
light” 
Source of 
Product 
Technology 
▪ Products Inc., MakerHub • Products Inc., MakerHub 
Primary source 
for viable and 
innovative 
product ideas 
▪ Products Inc. engineers, MakerHub 
employees 
• Products Inc. executives or engineers 
Engineering 
Technical Scope 
▪ Analyze technical feasibility of new 
technology, develop/adopt new 
technology, stress test new 
technology,  
• Analyze technical feasibility of new 
technology, develop new technology, 
stress test new technology 
Decision 
Making 
▪ Managers decide what moves forward 
▪ Cost driving product development 
decisions  
▪ Before moving the project forward to 
market validation, leadership asked 
for cost-benefit analysis. 
▪ [MakerHub] is becoming stifled with 
“more centralized leadership making 
that emphasizes profits”  
• Project managers decide what moves 
forward and what does not.         
• Engineer related a time he worked for 
months on a project that was eventually 
discontinued when a new project 
manager came in.        
• Former CEO concerned project 
managers were not developing 
innovative enough products 
Source of 
Legitimacy 
▪ Technology’s innovativeness  
▪ Organizational profitability 
▪ Profitability 
▪ Technology’s innovativeness 
Practices/Materi
al/ 
Structures 
▪ Daily meetings, scheduled work 
hours, outcome reports, product 
deadlines/Gantt Charts, Products Inc. 
training meetings, end-of-year 
evaluations, 5S 
▪ Daily meetings, scheduled work hours, 
outcome reports, product deadlines/Gantt 
Charts, Products Inc. training meetings, 
end-of-year evaluations 
Physical 
Environment  
▪ Open environment—anyone can walk 
in      
▪ Located on edge of college campus    
▪ Makerspace with tools available to 
anyone 
▪ Located at Corporate HQ     
▪ Locked doors with special access 
required to enter 
▪ Advanced machinery only used by 
Products Inc. employees 
Cognitive Scope  
▪ Employees can explore/ideate 
products related to small or large 
home appliances 
▪ Explore technology that could potentially 
be used in large appliances related to the 
specific product line in which they work 
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▪ Focus on products easily incorporated 
into Products Inc. manufacturing lines 
OR on products small enough to be 
shipped via FedEx directly to 
consumers. 
Stakeholder 
Access  
▪ Have access to makers, culinary 
enthusiasts, first adopters, consumers, 
Products Inc., and other interested 
parties (local and regional politicians, 
non-profits, startups, corporations, 
universities) 
▪ Products Inc. 
Level of 
Formality 
▪ “You never know who will walk in. . . 
That’s exciting!”     
▪ “Coolest place I’ll ever work” 
▪ Formal working environment 
*Similarities (shaded grey) and Differences (shaded white) between Products Inc. R&D and 
MakerHub
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Phase 1: Environmental Forces and MakerHub’s Founding 
MakerHub’s mission was to ideate, prototype, and validate never-seen-before 
technologies and products (2017-9-14_O). MakerHub would accomplish its mission 
through shortening the idea-to-product cycle by soliciting makers, enthusiasts, and 
potential customers for product ideas, feedback on proposed products, and testing 
minimum viable products, which would lead to more feedback and further testing (2017-
9-22_O).  
When MakerHub was founded, the key parts still different from the R&D unit today 
were made to be intentionally different (See Table 1). I describe those key parts below. 
However, there were also parts which were intended to be different but are no longer 
different. I will describe each of these as well. 
Physical Environment. Product Inc. founded MakerHub with a distinct organizational 
design (separate from itself) in several ways. First, MakerHub was founded to be unique 
by being physically distinct from Products Inc. The term physical environment represents 
the idea of tangible and aesthetic characteristics, which includes 1) geographic location 
(located on a university campus and geographically separate from Products Inc.’s corporate 
campus), 2) ease of building  access (unlocked, open to anyone), 3) aesthetic distinctness 
(open layout), and 4) availability of tools, machines, and areas to prototype (makerspace, 
micro-factory).  
MakerHub’s physical environment is in stark contrast to Products Inc.’s corporate 
campus (2017-9-22_O). Whereas MakerHub is on the edge of a college campus, easily 
accessible with a parking lot mere feet from the door, Products Inc. has gates with a 
security guard; visitors have to sign in, and all employees walk through turnstiles to access 
65 
 
the various buildings. MakerHub was intentionally designed to be physically distinct and 
geographically separate from Products Inc. MakerHub’s leadership wanted to foster 
creativity and thought the environment’s openness and accessibility would be welcoming 
to makers and enthusiasts, generating increased engagement. However, these desires were 
only partially realized. 
The physical layout of MakerHub consists of four primary sections; each serves a 
specific function. The first section contains two industrial kitchens and a number of 
workstations primarily used by the commercial team and office manager. This space also 
contains an area for meals and presentations and is used on a weekly basis for meetings 
with all MakerHub employees present. Moreover, the space is used for interviews for 
prospective interns or employees, conversations with interested news organizations, and 
impromptu meetings between employees. In addition to the practical function, this section 
also serves a symbolic function as the section contains a number of MakerHub products as 
well as community developed prototypes, providing visitors tangible evidence of 
MakerHub’s output.   
The second section is the makerspace, consisting of two floors. The majority of 
engineers sit at workbenches in the middle of the lower level while the software engineers, 
designer, and social media manager sit on the upper level. The makerspace contains several 
3D printers, a number of hand tools, a laser cutter, soldering stations, white boards, 
workbenches, and several computer stations with CAD software. A second meeting place 
is located off to the side with a large table, chairs, two whiteboards, and a TV to mirror 
computer screens. Unlike Products Inc.’s locked R&D centers, the makerspace offers a 
collaborative environment open to guests. MakerHub constructed the makerspace to 
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encourage prototyping and building; however, the space is primarily used by MakerHub 
employees or university students. 
The third section is the workshop where many parts are machined. This section is 
accessible only by a key card and people must wear protective eyewear to enter. This space 
houses fifty machines, including band saws, lathes, mills, a water jet, table saw, joiner, 
planer, sander, belt sander, surface grinder, and other machines and tools. This area also 
contains shelves stacked with different types of wood. The workshop is a critical part of 
MakerHub’s prototyping process as MakerHub engineers require customized components 
for product development.   
Adjacent to the workshop is the fourth section, the micro-factory, where many of 
the initial production batches are assembled. Long workstations are designed so that 
student workers and interns can assemble production units that have been sold. This section 
also contains a storage area, loading dock, and several testing areas for product testing. 
Products Inc.’s manufacturing capabilities are designed for large batch production to 
maximize efficiency and lower per unit costs. For MakerHub to manufacture tens or even 
hundreds of units at Products Inc. would be an inefficient use of resources. Thus, 
MakerHub’s own manufacturing capabilities are cost-effective.  
Cognitive Scope. The second way in which Products Inc. founded MakerHub as unique 
was by giving its employees expanded mental space concerning product ideas, what I am 
calling cognitive scope. Whereas Products Inc.’s R&D teams each have a defined product 
line focusing and constraining their cognitive scope, MakerHub employees’ cognitive 
scope extends to all product lines, including both large and small appliances. A key 
distinction between the cognitive scope at Products Inc. and MakerHub is the frequency of 
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making, experimenting, and employee autonomy—the ability for employees to work on 
projects they find intrinsically interesting. When MakerHub was founded, the leadership 
emphasized the importance of employees working on projects they were passionate about, 
arguing that focused passion would enable more creative thinking and commitment to a 
project. Of MakerHub’s founding director, one former employee remembered: 
[The founding director] was a rare leader in which he wanted everybody to 
explore the thing they were most passionate about. His theory was we've 
hired really good people, and if they're on some sort of vein like let him 
mine it. And you know if there's some way that they can find greatness in 
the thing you are searching for, then awesome. And I think that was very 
enabling with [Founding director]. (2018-12-12_I) 
 
The makerspace environment and openness of MakerHub convey a creative space for 
passionate people and are conducive to having impromptu conversations about product 
ideas, mechanical explanations of “how things work” between engineers, or in some cases 
just prototyping an idea (2017-9-14_O). While giving a tour to undergraduate students, a 
senior member of the commercial team remarked that MakerHub often generates product 
ideas through normal daily conversations between employees asking, “What about this?” 
(2019-1-31_O). Products Inc. units also hold meetings, day-long trainings, and events at 
MakerHub with the primary intent of spurring creative thinking.  
Relational Access. Third, MakerHub was unique because its employees were empowered 
with increased access to diverse stakeholders. The term relational scope represents this 
idea of diverse stakeholder access. Whereas Products Inc. R&D engineers primarily 
interact with executive management, product line project managers, and other engineers in 
the R&D field, MakerHub employees interact with makers, culinary enthusiasts, first 
adopters, consumers, Products Inc. engineers, and other interested parties (local and 
regional politicians, non-profits, startups, corporations, universities, and news outlets).  
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A significant assumption in the founding of MakerHub was that smart and creative 
people desire to develop innovative products and associate with a place where ideas could 
be iterated, prototyped, and potentially launched: “when we talked about community we 
were mostly talking about a group of people that would be like minded individuals who 
would want to tinker on new appliances ideas with us” (2018-12-17_I). MakerHub was an 
attempt at capturing some of this brain power while also being a consumer-facing and 
community-facing mechanism intended to create goodwill. Consequently, creating buy-in 
from many in the community was critical to MakerHub’s ability to accomplish this 
relational goal.  
MakerHub’s founding was celebrated by many different stakeholders, enabling 
potential opportunities for engagement. Excited stakeholders included makers, startups, 
nonprofits, local and state governments, and a large state university on whose campus 
MakerHub currently resides. Each stakeholder group viewed MakerHub as a positive factor 
in their own mission, whether that be developing local entrepreneurial ecosystems, being 
a resource to pre-stage startups building prototypes, attracting engineering and design 
students, or claiming to be innovative through the creation of an entrepreneurial 
environment.  
To foster community engagement, corporate leadership determined MakerHub 
must not only look and act distinct from the large, intimidating, corporate environment of 
Products Inc. but also provide employees leeway to engage the outside community, 
including makers, enthusiasts (first adopters, amateur chefs etc.), or potential consumers. 
Consequently, MakerHub employees were encouraged to engage community members 
both inside and outside MakerHub’s physical building. And the building itself was 
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designed to inspire outside community to come into MakerHub. Whereas Products Inc. 
requires all visitors check in at a security hut before entering through turnstile gates, 
MakerHub often has individuals walk in unexpectedly, desiring to use machines, tools, or 
take a tour.  
a. Tours: Distinct from Products Inc., MakerHub engages with the community 
internally in several ways, including tours and hackathons. Tours of MakerHub’s facility 
are a practical way for community to “see what MakerHub is all about.” Tours range 
anywhere from twenty minutes to over an hour, pending on schedule constraints, which 
employee gives the tour, and for whom the tour is given. In fact, I once gave a tour when 
MakerHub was short-handed (2018-9-10_O). MakerHub tours consist of three distinct 
parts: first, an overview and the purpose of MakerHub and its relationship with Products 
Inc. is discussed; second, the tour guide provides examples of past and current products; 
and third, he or she showcases the equipment and machines available for both MakerHub 
employees and anyone from the community. 
MakerHub tours were also designed to create a sense of community and do so in a 
number of ways. First, most full-time MakerHub employees give tours, including all 
members of the executive team down to more recent hires, providing opportunities for 
employees to articulate the purpose of MakerHub to diverse groups. Second, tours are a 
means of showcasing products under development as well as those developed through 
hackathons (braille stove top), by community members (laundry application for seeing 
impaired), or failed prototypes (cold brew coffee maker). Tours showcase these various 
products and are a means of talking about the engagement MakerHub has with its various 
community members. Third, tours are an easy means of collecting visceral feedback about 
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products under development. Often senior management will ask those on tours what they 
think about various products, wanting to gain ideas or confirmation about what MakerHub 
is developing. Asking for feedback provides a sense of participation by those taking a tour, 
further establishing relational connections.  
b. Hackathons: Hackathons share a dual purpose as they develop community 
relationships and new product ideas. Hackathons generate diverse perspectives and engage 
both potential entrepreneurs with new product ideas as well as validate customer and 
product segments. Hackathons have grown from dozens to over a couple hundred 
participants. For example, in 2018, MakerHub hosted a two-day hackathon that included 
over 200 participants.  
In the past, hackathons have also been a means of local non-profits engaging with 
MakerHub on social-impact projects. For example, MakerHub’s first hackathon was in 
partnership with a local non-profit that focuses on water purification mechanisms for third 
world countries (2019-1-23_I). The hackathon centered on different purification solutions 
to turn undrinkable water into drinkable water. More recently, a local government entity 
and MakerHub’s management are discussing a civic hackathon focused on local 
community problems.  
c. External Engagement: Although MakerHub is successful in attracting diverse 
visitor groups3, they also emphasize getting out into the community—both locally and 
nationally (2018-7-9_O). One way MakerHub accomplishes this is by embracing the maker 
                                                          
3Interested visitors come to learn about how MakerHub innovates, see the physical space, 
and ask questions about ways to imitate MakerHub’s processes. Visitors include 
consultants from top national and international firms, local and regional politicians, 
CEOs and other executives from Fortune 500 companies, professors from Top 20 
business schools, and journalists and media from national outlets.   
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culture. MakerFaire is an organization that celebrates makers and making. The organization 
helps local communities launch events that attract participants from local makerspaces, 
companies, non-profits, makers, and regional high school and college students. MakerHub 
has participated in the local MakerFaire for several years and even hosted the event in 
2018. While a hackathon went on inside MakerHub, a MakerFaire was hosted outside its 
building in the parking lot drawing over 3,000 people (2018-9-16_O). Although events like 
MakerFaire are successful, MakerHub has been less successful in attracting makers into 
the building to work on long-term projects. However, MakerHub has been extremely 
successful engaging culinary enthusiasts such as local chefs (2018-2-14_O). 
MakerHub engineers are particularly good at engaging culinary experts. For 
example, in late 2017, MakerHub engineers were investigating the viability and desirability 
of a product targeting grilling enthusiasts. A lead engineer on the project reached out to a 
local butcher to gain advice and suggestions on both the process and expected outcomes 
such as what the meat should look like, how it should taste, potential problems to avoid, 
and best practices for storage and cleanliness. I accompanied three other MakerHub 
employees to the butcher shop and we toured their facilities (2017-11-3_O). 
 MakerHub successfully generated excitement among many diverse stakeholders 
within the community (2018-8-29_O). Moreover, MakerHub engineers often interact with 
culinary experts to gauge product quality or functionality. However, MakerHub’s 
assumptions concerning sustained participation by makers, both locally and digitally, have 
not been fully realized, which has led to a recent effort to increase the quality of external 
engagements (e.g. increased interactions) rather than quantity (2018-11-30_I).  
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Level of Formality.  Fourth, MakerHub was also founded to be unique because of its low 
level of formality. MakerHub leadership believed a low level of formality would enable 
greater external input (more outsiders would engage in the ideation, prototyping, design, 
and selling processes). A low level of formality is demonstrated through MakerHub’s 
emphasis on casual dress (most employees wear jeans and t-shirts), frequent laughter, 
informal manager-employee relationships, loud music, and coffee shop type atmosphere—
all much more informal than Products Inc.’s (2018-2-19_O). Processes, rules, and symbolic 
norms also embody specific logics. In an effort to be different from Products Inc., 
MakerHub embraced numerous anti-corporate routines and norms to create meaningful 
separation between itself and Products Inc. Such actions include: 1) open access to the 
building and makerspace, 2) casually dressed employees intended to enable outsiders to 
feel comfortable coming into the space, 3) loud, popular music played throughout the 
facility, giving a non-corporate, coffee shop feel to the environment, 4) using signs made 
on MakerHub’s laser printers and shop bots, articulating the rules that connotes the 
impression outsiders are not only welcome but wanted, and 5) free use of makerspace tools 
including 3D printers, laser cutter, hand tools, soldering stations, CAD software, 
workbenches, and gourmet coffee.  
MakerHub’s efforts to create an informal culture welcoming to visitors worked. I 
have observed hundreds of visitors via tours, hackathons, and events. Their reactions often 
reflect surprise over the makerspace’s size and workshop’s capabilities; interest over the 
types of products MakerHub has developed and is developing; and enjoyment of the 
popular music, gourmet coffee, relaxed environment, and friendly employees (2018-9-
15_O).  
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MakerHub Founding Logics. In its founding phase, MakerHub exhibited distinctly 
different logics than the traditional corporate or professional logic used to describe 
Products Inc., demonstrated by creating a physically distinct, open environment conducive 
to enabling and encouraging employees to think creativity and in untraditional ways. 
MakerHub’s founding logics were further differentiated by leadership’s focus on creating 
relational access, engaging community both inside and outside MakerHub. Lastly, 
MakerHub attempted to also separate from Products Inc.’s logics by creating informal 
social norms, which include loud music, gourmet coffee, open workspace, most employees 
wear t-shirt and jeans, frequent laughter, impromptu cooking tutorials between employees, 
and a flat social hierarchy (frequent and casual interaction between senior and junior staff). 
I contend these practices, norms, and symbols suggest a different type of logic, a startup 
logic. 
MakerHub’s Founding Assumptions 
MakerHub was founded with two fundamental assumptions. The first assumption 
was that MakerHub could engage in a quicker, more creative, new product idea validation 
process than Products Inc.’s traditional process by being both unique (e.g. physical 
environment, cognitive scope, relational access, and level of formality) and capable of 
ideating, building, designing, testing, and small-batch manufacturing new product ideas. 
MakerHub’s second founding assumption was that external inputs (ideas, time, labor, 
skills) from makers, enthusiasts, and potential consumers, would foster creative product 
ideas, and assist with the building and designing of prototypes, further increasing the level 
of product innovativeness. The goal was to develop innovative products quickly in order 
to validate if there was a market for the product idea (profitable), a market for something 
74 
 
close to the product idea to which they could pivot (potentially profitable), or no market 
for the product idea (not profitable).  
I examine these assumptions as they emerge through two key innovation processes: 
1) Active Builds, and 2) Product Market Validation. An Active Build refers to the ideation, 
prototyping, and design of a product. Product 1 and any accessory products (accessory 
products are any products which are developed as part of or in addition to the initial 
product) represents one active build. Product 2 (and any accessory products) represents a 
second active build and so on. Product Market Validation refers to the number of customers 
buying products. MakerHub leadership believed that they would be able to keep 
introducing new builds as long as there was a general trend of validation of those builds 
over time, a self-reinforcing, positive feedback loop (R1, See Figure 1). A self-reinforcing 
loop is an unchecked, positive feedback loop which, left unchecked, can lead to exponential 
growth. Exponential growth did not occur as loops, which I will introduce later in this 
chapter, constrained this process. However, Product 1’s Build—Product Market Validation 
process occurred largely as expected.  
Figure 1: The Build-and-Validate Reinforcing Loop (R1) 
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Phase 2: Product 1 and “Can we sell?” 
Key Events: As depicted in Figure 1, MakerHub employees believed that product 
development would occur through a process of building and validating. Therefore, they 
began by trying to come up with a build that they could use to begin the process. One of 
the initial engineers knew of a technology within Products Inc. that had not been built yet 
that would enable “dumb appliances” to be reprogrammed to become “smart appliances.” 
Product 1 was designed as an add-on that required intermediate programming knowledge 
and was targeted to the DIY community—particularly makers interested in hacking their 
home appliances. One employee at the time related,  
So a project that we were working on early was [Product 1]. . . [MakerHub 
engineer] had been looking around for ways that we could reach out to 
community and he found out there was a conference . . . hosted by Make 
Magazine in San Francisco. And so he told me we should sign up for it. So 
[founding MakerHub director] said, ‘you're going to go out and speak at 
this thing.’ And when we did, we said ‘we gotta have something to say.’ 
So we had been working on developing [Product 1], and we decided to 
launch it coincident with that conference. . . .The Maker culture really 
latched onto the idea that [Products Inc.] was interested in that (hacking). . 
. .And we sold a lot of those things . . . I got on stage and talked about the 
thing, and then we had a little chat with Make Magazine. And we sold like 
. . . 50 in a day and 100 in a week, which was for us like crazy. (2018-12-
17_I)  
 
MakerHub’s leadership interpreted Product 1’s success as evidence makers and 
enthusiasts were willing to engage with MakerHub and willing to spend time hacking 
appliances, despite MakerHub’s ties to a large corporation. Again, the same employee 
noted, 
If we're being honest, . . .most people who are involved in open source 
don't think of big corporations as their friends. So that (success of Product 
1) was an early indicator that we […] were doing things different. And the 
people who are most likely to want to come out and purchase one of those 
were the exact people that you would want to target for this thing because 
they're dedicated beyond just being like a weekend warrior and they're like, 
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‘Oh I'm actually gonna sit down and write some code for my appliances.’ 
So to get 300 people like that on board early on is actually a big deal. (2018-
12-17_I) 
 
Although makers were uninvolved in the ideation or prototyping of Product 1, MakerHub 
leadership believed Product 1 confirmed MakerHub’s ability to engage makers and sell 
new products, increasing its market validation. The building and validation of Product 1 
led to activities that would culminate into the development of Product 2, such that 
validation motivated more builds and more builds motivated more validation. This self-
reinforcing, positive feedback loop occurred with MakerHub as the success of Product 1 
quickly led to the continued development of Product 2 (the second build).  
Summary: Affirming R1’s Process 
 MakerHub’s initial product targeted the type of people MakerHub wished to 
develop long-term relationships with—namely, makers. Moreover, Product 1’s successful 
market validation generated a second active build. Thus, the belief that product 
development would occur through a process of building and validating was further 
solidified through R1’s successful verification.  
Phase 3: Expanding Customer Segments 
Having validated the first product and verified the development process, MakerHub 
employees then began developing Product 2. Product 2 incorporated precision temperature 
technology in a single stovetop and probe. This system enables liquids to be kept at a 
constant temperature. The stovetop provided the heat, and the probe measured the liquid’s 
temperature, fostering greater control. For example, Product 2 allowed for individuals to 
cook steaks via Sues Vide (in a pot of water on a stove), allowing users to cook steaks to 
the desired internal temperature.   
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Figure 2: Expanding its Target Market Reinforcing Loop (R2) 
 
The level of Product 1’s success and market validation led to additional builds and 
further product market validation activities as well as increased the Scope of Ambition for 
Product 2 (See Figure 2). Scope of Ambition refers to how ambitious the organization is 
becoming, which can include ambition relating to 1) how uncertain a product’s market is, 
2) the number of external stakeholders involved in the product’s ideation, prototyping, or 
design, or 3) the size of the market the organization is trying to capture with the product. 
Product 2 suggested a greater scope for MakerHub’s ambition because Product 2 
incorporated more market uncertainty (e.g. dissimilar from existing products and more 
expensive4), increased the number of stakeholders involved (e.g. design challenge, 
YouTube, news outlets), explored a different validation strategy (Indie GoGo), and was 
targeted toward a larger consumer market (home chefs and culinary enthusiasts)5. 
                                                          
4Product 2’s MSRP was $179, significantly higher than Product 1’s price-point of $20. 
5Product 2 required no coding and was targeted primarily to culinary enthusiasts who 
desired precise control of cooking. 
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An increase in MakerHub’s scope of ambition for Product 2 is further evidenced 
by an increase in the number of organizational activities, which refers to the number of 
activities related to the ideation, prototyping, design, and validation of a product. When the 
efforts to market and launch Product 1 succeeded, MakerHub management duplicated 
many of those same strategies for Product 2. However, MakerHub also increased the 
number of activities, particularly around sales and marketing; they conducted a design 
challenge, launched and wrote copy for their crowdfunding campaign, produced videos 
demonstrating how Product 2 worked, and increased overall advertising spending. 
Launching a crowdfunding campaign through Indie GoGo was an attractive option because 
manufacturing costs could be covered by pre-orders, rather than generating up front cost 
through manufacturing units and then trying to sell those units. 
The increase in organizational activities subsequently increased the number of 
stakeholders involved, which refers to the number of stakeholders involved in the ideation, 
prototyping, design, and validation of a product. Stakeholders included the design 
challenge participants, news outlets such as the New York Times, and over 2,000 
crowdfunding campaign contributors, generating over $350,000. In addition to growing 
consumer awareness, MakerHub attempted to use their community—both local community 
and online community—through creating a design challenge, in which multiple individuals 
submit design ideas to MakerHub, and the first, second, and third place finishers received 
some type of remuneration. MakerHub’s design team incorporated aspects of each 
finalists’ designs in Product 2’s design.  
Reinforcing Loop (R2). MakerHub’s crowdfunding campaign was successful in that they 
reached the required goal to continue on with the manufacturing and producing of Product 
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2. MakerHub’s leadership interpreted Product 2’s success as evidence MakerHub could 
sell to both makers and culinary enthusiasts. While Product 2 did not sell as many units as 
hoped, successfully launching a crowdfunding campaign—particularly on their first 
attempt—was a significant milestone in justifying MakerHub’s commitment to small 
batch, quick product development (2018-12-17_I).  Moreover, the successful 
crowdfunding campaign led to further validating Product 2’s potential by meeting the 
crowdfunding goal via generating actual sales, an important step in the overall validation 
process (Blank & Dorf, 2012). This process generates a second self-reinforcing feedback 
loop (R2, See Figure 2), motivating both MakerHub and benefited stakeholders to 
additional active builds and further market validation activities.  
As noted earlier, MakerHub’s positive R1 feedback loop did not grow 
exponentially. The overall lack of non-employee engagement with Product 2 partially 
tested MakerHub’s assumption about the “tinkering” role non-employees would play in 
product development. This assumption began to evolve as external inputs for Product 2 
were primarily aesthetic and had little impact on ideation or technical development. 
Although makers and enthusiasts were excited about MakerHub, its mission, and the type 
of product development occurring, the design challenge was the most significant 
contribution by anyone outside of MakerHub. One employee described the change in 
thinking:  
In the beginning, we had the hypothesis that community was going to be a group 
of people that were kind of a jack of all trades. They were people that were 
enthusiasts that were also makers that would be people that we could collaborate 
with that would develop product with us. And then eventually we'll make prototype 
to be something that they purchase. So we found that's not broadly true. Within a 
large swath of the population there are (only) a few people that are similar to that, 
people that are so passionate about something that they'll carry it all the way 
through. (2018-11-30) 
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Summary. Product 2’s development and launch suggests tension between startup, 
corporate, and community logics. Launching a design challenged proved an effective and 
efficient way to engage external aesthetic input (corporate logic) while also maintaining 
the organizational identity of corporate venture makerspace—an organization intent on co-
creating (engaging external input in the development process). However, Product 2 
expanded MakerHub’s target market from maker to culinary enthusiast, increased 
advertising spending, and utilized free marketing channels (corporate logic).  
Phase 4: Success and Bureaucracy 
During phase 4, several negative balancing feedback loops emerged (B1, B2, & 
B3). Balancing feedback loops stabilize a system through tension, preventing the system 
from collapse or exponential growth. These loops arise from the addition of two new 
dimensions in the model: Awareness of Execution Problems and Bureaucracy. I define 
awareness of execution problems as the extent to which individuals (both internal and 
external to MakerHub) are cognizant of issues surrounding a product’s development, 
design, or delivery. I define bureaucracy as the extent to which an organization implements 
formal rules or protocols (See Figure 3). Below, I discuss Product 3’s process through R2. 
I then highlight the challenges which arose, generating each of the negative balancing 
feedback loops (B1, B2, & B3). 
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Figure 3: Delivery Problems and Bureaucracy 
 
Product 3 revolved around a product idea already available in large units to 
commercial buyers but unavailable to the residential market. The technology and idea for 
this product came from Products Inc. engineers who wanted to incorporate the product’s 
function into a kitchen appliance unit; however, the idea received pushback and the 
initiative stalled. When MakerHub was founded, those engineers saw a potential outlet to 
make their idea a reality; MakerHub developed the idea into a stand-alone, counter top 
product (Product 3). (2017-12-15_O) 
Product 3 through R2. Similar to Product 2, MakerHub launched an Indie GoGo 
crowdfunding campaign and utilized past marketing strategies and channels to create 
excitement among first adopters and technology enthusiasts, including activities such as 
conferences in which to showcase the product and talk with news outlets. However, 
Product 2’s success also led to an increase in scope of ambition for Product 3. Product 3’s 
MSRP was over $500 and was not targeted to makers. With Product 3, MakerHub was 
testing a different consumer market. 
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Product 3 also led to a significant increase in original activities. MakerHub spent 
money for ads on Facebook, adopted a more effective pricing strategy, traveled to New 
York City to promote the product and generate excitement among different demographics, 
launched a website to gage interest, and continued to develop consumer excitement through 
emails and website promotions. The amount spent on advertising and marketing also 
dramatically increased for Product 3, which also led to an increase in the number of 
stakeholders involved. One former executive related the marketing strategy and its impact 
on Product 3’s overall success:  
The other thing that's different is we really doubled down on a new channel for 
generating leads. So all of the leads for [Product 2] were generated through people 
that we happen to know, people who walked through the doors, channels that we 
had access to. So, I'll give you one random example. [Products Inc.] had a 
publication that they put out for investors and other people who are associated with 
[Products Inc.]. We got interviewed by them and got out in front of them. Any 
channel that we could access that was free for us. We got in front of [Products 
Inc.’s] newsletter for Product 3 and media. For [Product 3], we weren't as nervous 
about putting a little bit of money behind it because now we'd seen that it was a 
channel that could work for us. So we did all of the free channels plus we turned 
on the ads. And that was a huge thing for us to overcome because ads tend to be 
pretty expensive to run. We had run seven thousand dollars worth of ads on the 
[Product 2] campaign actually on YouTube of all places, and it resulted in like five 
sales maybe something like that. . . We didn't really go very deep into ads on the 
[Products 2] campaign. . . Seven thousand dollars sounded like just an 
outrageously high number for us to spend for ads. . . We were hoping to see “oh, 
seven thousand dollars and you sell another 300 or 400 units,” and we sold three 
or four. But [a newly hired sales member] actually came in and said no we really 
didn't do ads and so he actually ran the ad campaign for Product 3’s campaign. 
And that really ended up being the thing that made him throw it to (millions of 
dollars). Without that […] it wouldn't have been anywhere near as big as it was. I 
don't think our ad spend was particularly efficient, but it was really important for 
us to do it because it created a business that otherwise probably wouldn't exist. 
(2018-12-17_I) 
 
The increase in resources allocated toward marketing was so significant that according to 
the marketing manager at the time of Product 3’s launch, the Products Inc. executive 
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overseeing MakerHub called often, “freaking out” over the amount being spent on 
marketing activities. (2018-12-12_I) 
Challenges and Balancing Loops. MakerHub also experienced a number of challenges 
with Product 3. First, while the engineers figured out the technical side of developing the 
product as a stand-alone unit that could sit on a countertop, reliability, durability, and size 
were all problems yet to be solved. Once the engineers felt certain they could solve those 
problems, management told the commercial team to start the crowdfunding campaign even 
though the end design and technology were incomplete. When the crowdfunding campaign 
was wildly successful, the engineers were under significant pressure to not only deliver the 
product as described but also to deliver on time (2017-11-29_O). One former MakerHub 
employee remembered, “Whenever [Product 3] was going on, it was f***ing chaos. . . 
Everyone was freaking out” (2018-12-12_I). MakerHub’s increase in activities increased 
the awareness of execution problems. Further, an increase in awareness of execution 
problems combined with the promise to customers of a certain delivery date resulted in a 
sense of heightened pressure. An employee at the time viscerally remembered the chaos 
and stress saying, “If we do another crowdfunding campaign, I’m quitting.” The increase 
in awareness of execution problems coupled with the desire not to repeat the same level of 
chaos which ensued generates a negative balancing feedback loop (B1 in Figure 3)    
MakerHub’s first challenge also generated a second negative balancing feedback 
loop (B2 in Figure 4) as an increase in stakeholders exacerbated execution problems. 
Product 3 ended up being shipped over several months later than promised in the campaign. 
The delay resulted in upset customers and hundreds of emails from people asking about 
the delivery date of their purchase. Commercial team members whose jobs were to explore 
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sales channels and develop marketing strategies were now responsible for customer 
questions, which subsequently led to developing standard protocols for how to respond in 
emails, what could or could not be said, and how refunds were processed. One commercial 
manager said, “I was responding to over 120 emails a day for weeks” (2017-11-30_O). The 
increase in organizational activities, particularly the increase in advertising and marketing 
spending, had the intended effect of raising Product 3’s visibility; however, when Product 
3 was delayed, the increase in visibility also meant an increased awareness of execution 
problems by external stakeholders (consumers, suppliers, or those following the 
crowdfunding campaign). This dynamic generates a second negative balancing feedback 
loop (B2 in Figure 3).  
A second challenge MakerHub experienced with Product 3—generating B3—was 
that once the product was shipped, MakerHub’s commercial team and product engineers 
were ill prepared for the customer service aspect of selling a highly successful product. 
These included angry customers who had broken units, confused customers who did not 
understand how something worked and needed someone to walk them through it, ecstatic 
customers sending congratulatory emails, and many other emails and phone calls for 
various reasons. Additional protocols were developed for broken units, repairs, or replacing 
units. Customers were directed to follow a standard procedure that included taking pictures 
of the unit and emailing those pictures to a specific email address. The awareness of 
execution problems prompted MakerHub leadership to develop protocols to better handle 
reoccurring complaints and issues, which increased MakerHub’s overall level of 
bureaucracy. As defined earlier, bureaucracy represents formal rules and protocols an 
organization puts into place. As more issues were uncovered, protocols were developed. 
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Handling customer complaints, product repairs, or other related issues were not 
MakerHub’s original intent. This dynamic generates a third negative balancing feedback 
loop (B3 in Figure 3).  
A third challenge MakerHub experienced with Product 3 was the impact success 
had on future products. Given Product 3’s success, consumers wanted and suggested add-
ons. One consumer hacked an add-on and sent a picture to the engineering team who 
thought they could develop and produce the idea relatively easily. Subsequent to the initial 
product, a number of add-on products were developed and sold. These add-on products 
were incremental innovations, “not the kind of innovations MakerHub was intended to 
produce” (2019-2-19_O). To better maximize both Product 3’s profitability and accessory 
product development, MakerHub restructured part of the engineering team, and the lead 
engineer on Product 3’s development became lead on all projects related to Product 3 
(2018-1-25_O). Product 3’s success generated additional incremental innovation products. 
I have defined builds as distinct product lines. Accessory products are therefore absorbed 
and are explained by the current model without further adjustment.  
Because of Product 3’s success, leadership realized MakerHub could generate 
significant excitement in broader markets among consumers enthusiastic about specific 
value propositions. Product 3’s success encouraged more emphasis on marketing spending 
such as promotional campaigns, conference engagements, and social media engagements 
than past products.  
Summary. In order to develop its own set of capabilities around sales and supply chain, 
MakerHub needed more than a startup logic. A corporate logic was adopted and manifested 
in a number of ways, including through digital content and marketing efforts. Just prior to 
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transitioning between MakerHub and a Products Inc. promotion, one employee remarked, 
“MakerHub is different now than when [the initial director] ran it. We used to be more 
focused on makers, staying true to the community and who they are. Now we are more 
concerned about making a profitable business . . . the difference in those approaches 
necessitated different digital marketing approaches” (2017-10-17_O). When MakerHub 
adopted a corporate logic to facilitate capabilities development, the startup logic driving 
much of MakerHub’s initial approach was replaced. The emphasis on corporate logics is 
further demonstrated in MakerHub’s focus and the number of projects worked on. One 
MakerHub executive recently commented, “We haven’t had this many projects going on 
since before [Product 3]” (2019-2-14_O) 
Phase 5: Failure and Learning 
During phase 5, two additional reinforcing feedback loops emerged (R3 and R4). 
These loops arose from the addition of one dimension in the model: Process Learning 
Emphasis. A process learning emphasis includes 1) the number of activities completed in 
determining when market validation is considered to be done and 2) the rigor of metrics 
used in determining when market validation is considered to be done (See Figure 4). 
Below, I describe Product 4 and discuss Product 4’s process through R2. I then explain 
how Product 4’s lack of market validation led to two reinforcing feedback loops (R3 & 
R4). R3 and R4 are “vicious circles” (Weick, 1979), reinforcing overall decreases in active 
builds and scope of ambition.  
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Figure 4: Learning from Failure 
 
MakerHub’s third crowdfunding campaign was a new brewing method for 
residential coffee drinkers (Product 4). The product was both significantly faster than 
current market solutions and provided gourmet coffee shop quality. An emphasis in their 
go-to-market strategy for this product was engagement with experts on the product’s taste. 
Because this was a first of its kind invention that revolved around the consumer’s 
perception of quality, MakerHub management and engineers felt the taste had to be 
comparable to what the high end coffee shops produced. Consequently, MakerHub 
engineers spent significant time engaging with coffee experts, particularly with baristas at 
local high-end coffee shops.  
Product 4 through R2. MakerHub’s increased ambition with Product 4 is demonstrated 
in Product 4’s novelty (unlike any other product on the market), MakerHub’s increased 
engagement with coffee baristas over taste, and both MakerHub’s uncertainty in how big 
the actual market was and uncertainty over the price point consumers would be willing to 
pay. Moreover, similar to past actions, MakerHub repeated the activities which made 
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Products 2 and 3 successful (e.g. marketing channels, engaging enthusiasts, launching a 
crowdfunding campaign etc.). MakerHub also held a design challenge, launched a 
crowdfunding campaign, and utilized past marketing strategies (2017-12-19_O), 
increasing the number of stakeholders involved. 
Lack of Product Market Validation. Past engagements with Indie GoGo liaisons had 
taught MakerHub that for crowdfunding campaigns to be successful, the campaign’s first 
couple days and final day were critical to the overall outcome as those were the biggest 
“funding” days. When MakerHub launched their innovative brewing method, the first 
couple days were underwhelming. Management was concerned the target goal would not 
be reached and decided to pull all advertising spending on Product 4, contending that if the 
product truly had value, advertising spending would not be necessary. Others argued that 
when advertising spending was cut for the product—primary through Facebook and other 
social media sites—there was little likelihood of Product 4 reaching the goal, and all 
potential for the product to move forward shut down.  
Consequences and Reinforcing Loops. The failure of Product 4 had two primary 
consequences on MakerHub’s subsequent actions. First, management emphasized the 
importance of learning from the failure in an effort to avoid future similar mistakes. 
MakerHub is an organization constantly learning, particularly within its engineering 
functions via prototyping and testing; however, Product 4’s lack of market validation led 
to an emphasis on process learning. Again, a process learning emphasis encapsulates the 
activities and metrics MakerHub uses to determine when the market validation process is 
done.  
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Although well intentioned, a dramatic increase in a process learning emphasis led 
to some level of paralysis:  “I think the organization got PTSD after that happened [Product 
4’s unsuccessful launch]. And it shouldn’t have happened because our organization was 
designed to . . . be a culture that would be able to manage failure. And I don’t think it 
managed that very well” (2018-12-17_I). Another executive commented, “We should’ve 
just moved on. [Product 4] failing wasn’t that bad. . . We held a funeral for that thing. Just 
move on . . . we learned the heck out of that” (2019-2-14).  
The second consequence of Product 4’s failure was on the number of active builds. 
Although MakerHub continued to launch products, they were primarily accessory 
products—already within an existing product line (e.g. within Products 2 and 3). New 
active builds appeared to slow as a process learning emphasis dictated more activities and 
more rigorous metrics to ensure similar mistakes were avoided. Management’s emphasis 
on process learning was evident even in lower risk items. For example, management 
debated for several weeks over one accessory item’s price point. Finally, one exasperated 
executive said emphatically, “just ship it out the door. If it doesn’t sell, who cares? Just get 
it out! It’s low risk” (2017-12-4_O). The desire to avoid future failure led to an increase in 
validation activities (e.g. surveys, consumer interactions) as well as an increased focus on 
low risk, accessory products. MakerHub’s actions suggest a negative reinforcing feedback 
loop (R3, See Figure 4). 
Efforts to learn from Product 4’s failure spawned additional processes and 
practices, increasing overall firm bureaucracy, generating an additional reinforcing 
negative feedback loop (R4, See Figure 4). Practices include a significant increase in 
surveys soliciting potential consumer preference around product features and an increased 
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emphasis on financial analyses. Although these practices are often couched in terms of 
learning, employees have voiced frustrated at the apparent decrease in product 
development speed and increase in overall risk aversion. However, as one employee noted 
to me that although he thinks MakerHub is slower now (as a result of Product 4’s failure), 
speed is difficult to measure because MakerHub is developing its own technology on 
several products rather than taking existing technology from Products Inc. This is an 
important point as part of MakerHub’s initial intent was to validate quickly. By developing 
its own technology, MakerHub is slowed and further imitates practices already conducted 
in Products Inc.’s R&D centers.  
Summary. After Product 4’s unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign, there was a significant 
shift in logics, which resulted from several coinciding factors. First, MakerHub’s founding 
director left for a personal family reason, and a long-time Products Inc. project manager 
(and engineer) was instilled as MakerHub’s new director. Although a startup logic would 
rationalize failing as both expected and necessary, the new director had been embedded in 
a professional-corporate logics hybrid where failure presents a learning opportunity to 
avoid future failure. Employees who speak fondly of this director also lament, “he [the new 
director] is very risk averse” (2019-2-14_O).  
 A second factor impacting a shift in MakerHub’s logics was the increasing 
profitability of Product 3 and the ability to produce even more accessory products. The 
failure of Product 4 combined with the continued success of Product 3 enabled MakerHub’s 
new director and primary decision maker to rely on his past thinking as a professional 
manager in a corporate setting. MakerHub could be profitable and reduce risk by launching 
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low technology, inexpensive accessory items that required relatively little resources and 
generated sufficient financial returns.  
The success of Products 1 and 2 were justification for MakerHub’s initial leadership 
coalition to increase the scope of ambition, culminating in significant investment of 
Product 3’s development and marketing. However, Product 4’s failure pressured the new 
leadership coalition dominated by a professional and corporate logic to renew efforts to 
maximize past innovations (Product 3) rather than continuing with a startup logic of 
quickly attempting new ones. The institutional logics perspective helps explain this shift 
and why an organization founded to be distinct began making more centralized decisions—
similar to Products Inc.’s R&D function. 
Phase 6: Identity Crisis 
The success of Product 3 and its subsequent add-on products provided a conundrum 
to MakerHub’s management. Was the goal to become profitable or innovative? A number 
of firm wide meetings ensued where employees argued over the mission and vision of 
MakerHub. Sales personnel questioned the extent of their role if profitability was a minor 
goal. Others, particularly those who helped start MakerHub, contended that the 
fundamental goal of MakerHub was to innovate and validate never-seen-before products, 
not develop long-term sales strategies. Moreover, they argued, MakerHub was becoming 
much like Products Inc. in its profit emphasis, centralized decision making, longer product 
development timelines, and process of identifying problems fostering product solutions 
(2017-10-13_O). Below, I relate the conflicting factors spawning these identity 
discussions. I then summarize by relating MakerHub’s efforts to maintain aspects of its 
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founding identity (driven by startup and community logics) while simultaneously shifting 
its focus (driven by professional and corporate logics).   
Conflicting Factors. Several conflicting factors spawned these discussions over 
MakerHub’s core identity and purpose. First, some argued that if the goal was to be 
profitable, why have MakerHub be distinct from Products Inc. at all? Although MakerHub 
is well fitted to prototype single units or “hack” existing products, it was not designed to 
produce units at scale. Therefore, if MakerHub was to shift its focus to a profit motive, the 
space constrained rather than enabled. Indeed, Products Inc.’s facilities were much better 
equipped for large scale production. As one former MakerHub executive commented, 
“MakerHub … is a physical space that can make goods. (MakerHub existed) only because 
Products Inc. wasn't ready to say, ‘Hey, we can create a place in our factory where we can 
make the stuff.’ There's nothing that is unique about the equipment back there, so you don't 
actually, in my opinion, need a physical space” (2018-12-17_I).  
A second factor that generated disagreement among employees about MakerHub’s 
identity and purpose was the way in which MakerHub began imitating Products Inc.’s 
decision making norms and the metrics by which decisions were made. Like Products Inc., 
MakerHub began operating under a central decision maker. Also similar to Products Inc., 
product decisions were being primarily driven by financial metrics, such as how many 
resources will be required to develop the product, and how risky the product is perceived 
to be. Answers to these decisions further informed the length of product development, 
potential customer segments, sales channels, and marketing strategies. In regard to the 
growing similarities between MakerHub and Products Inc., one employee commented how 
the “budgeting processes is becoming extremely granular” (2019-2-14_O). 
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A third factor that generated discussion over MakerHub’s identity and purpose was 
how decision making impacted what product ideas were invested in. Many current and 
past employees mentioned MakerHub’s seeming lack of focus on developing innovative 
products. As one team member lamented to me: “We don’t take big swings anymore. I’m 
embarrassed we even put that (pointing to a wall listing current products) on our wall 
under current products. That’s not innovative!” (2019-2-14_O). 
Summary. As MakerHub grappled with its purpose and identity, leadership utilized a 
segmented strategy, keeping distinct logics in tension. A corporate logic is apparent 
through the efforts to maximize Product 3’s success and was further demonstrated by an 
emphasis on developing profitable accessory products. Moreover, professional logics 
were strongly apparent through the continued emphasis on safety, fully understanding 
product technologies, and stress testing.   
MakerHub continued to be involved in local events such as MakerFaire, host 
hackathons, give tours, and hold events—all demonstrating at least trappings of a 
community logic. Further, leadership consistently utilized words, phrases, and symbols 
representative of a community logic, such as “we are all about community,” “we want you 
to engage with us,” “[MakerHub] begins and ends with community.” As MakerHub’s 
focus shifted, so did the definition of what “community” meant. I asked one long-time 
former employee if MakerHub still did “co-creation,” which is the idea of engaging with 
community to ideate, prototype, and design products with non-employees, she said, “No 
way!” (2017-12-17_O). However, when I asked a different employee, a senior member 
who had not been at MakerHub as long, he said, “I think we do co-creation now better 
than ever” (2017-12-19_O). His argument was that consumers were being questioned 
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about product features more than previously, which was his definition of co-creation. I 
found that employee tenure tended to be the primary determiner of how an employee 
responded to the question: does MakerHub do co-creation well? Whereas new employees 
felt like MakerHub did co-creation well, thereby embracing a community logic, longer 
tenured employees felt an emphasis on co-creation (and subsequently a community logics) 
had decreased.  
Lastly, efforts to maintain processes driven by startup logics primarily revolved 
around low-tech products or products requiring few resources to validate. During this time, 
MakerHub was approached by various external entities who wanted to engage with 
MakerHub’s engineers on projects related to a specific need. For example, a local religious 
leader asked MakerHub to develop an appliance add-on enabling easier adherence to 
religious observances. MakerHub engineers also worked with a local apartment complex 
to develop a vending machine-like system for laundry applications, enabling users to pay 
with credit cards rather than coins.  
When I discussed MakerHub’s current activities to engage external input in the 
ideation, development, design, and prototyping process with a former community member, 
he praised the quality of MakerHub’s engineers but said he thought they were constrained 
in their ability to get customer feedback:   
[MakerHub engineer] fantastic guy! He has his heart and his head in 100% 
the right place. In the three years I was in (city name), I saw him bump his 
head up against, like a bunch of times I've seen him try to go out and get 
customer feedback, and he gets his hand slapped every time by 
management, and I guess he's learned that that's not something we try to do. 
. . I think that's problematic. . . I think that their commitment to learning 
anything from the crowd is superficial. (2018-12-19_I) 
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Although MakerHub exhibits all four types of logics, disagreement and confusion over 
MakerHub’s identity and purpose impacted the kinds of activities, the amount of resources 
allocated to those activities, and the ways in which employees were encouraged or 
discouraged in pursuing diverse activities.  
Phase 7: New Division 
During phase 7, a fourth negative balancing feedback loop emerged (B4). An 
exogenous shock (New Division) generated an overall shift in MakerHub’s strategy by 
decreasing overall activities, leading to a new dimension: Stakeholder Closeness, which I 
define as the level and frequency of engagement with external stakeholders in the product 
development process (See Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Exogenous Shock and Stakeholder Closeness 
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Key Events. In the fall of 2018, Products Inc. launched the small appliances division, and 
two of MakerHub’s senior management team left MakerHub to lead it. Once MakerHub 
validates the market for a new product, the small appliances division will take over, 
enabling MakerHub to reduce the overall total number of activities related to sales and 
marketing new products, decreasing B1’s impact on R2. The new division’s impact on the 
overall system is already captured in the model, and new division is not a dimension in the 
system. The purpose for visually including new division in the model is for conceptual 
clarity (See Figure 5). 
The launch of the small appliances division spawned a refocus on developing product 
ideas. The new division enabled MakerHub to shift resources away from commercial 
related activities toward market validation activities, decreasing the number of original 
activities. One sales member lamented, “we have no interest in being profitable anymore” 
(2019-2-13_O). Further MakerHub's recent successes in crowdfunding low tech, low cost 
items through its own website are viewed by management as a means of interacting with 
different consumer groups around preferences and needs, maintaining its “maker” image, 
symbolically solidifying R1. MakerHub’s primary strategy for selling high-tech riskier 
products is through Products Inc.’s formal channels rather than through its own sales 
channels under the MakerHub brand, which further reflects this shift in resource allocation 
and decrease in commercial related activities, decreasing B2’s influence on R2.  
Major Actions. The launch of the new product division enabled MakerHub to refocus on 
ideation and relational engagement with enthusiasts (R1 & R2). One executive noted, “We 
haven’t worked on this many projects (concurrently) since before [Product 3]” (2019-2-
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14_O). Increased efforts are also underway to attract more makers and enthusiasts into the 
building. A current employee explains the shift in mindset:  
We're trying to be more close to community, more intimate. We're trying 
to be more physical with community as opposed to having [a] digital divide 
here because we found that we […] have a large number of people there 
internationally and on the digital side that are interested in [MakerHub]. 
But the amount of feedback that we're getting from them is relatively small 
in context to the amount of effort we might put into that. So we found that 
finding that searching for the groups that we want to interact with instead 
of having them come to us might be a better solution for getting higher 
fidelity feedback from the people that are going to care. So we've been 
strategizing on different ways to discover these enthusiast groups here 
locally or regionally and coming to them and learning from them. (2018-
11-30_I) 
 
Budget spending further reflects the shift in focus (See Phase 5 in Table 4). Recently, 
MakerHub hired a full-time community relations specialist to oversee, initiate, and develop 
community relationships both locally and nationally.  
MakerHub is currently shifting from an emphasis on broader activities and broader 
reach to more specific stakeholder engagements (i.e. stakeholder closeness) and a more 
focused set of activities around product validation. MakerHub’s renewed focus on 
validation is a return to its founding purpose; however, their stakeholder emphasis is 
subtlety different. MakerHub’s founding belief was that by engaging external inputs, 
MakerHub could quickly generate and prototype innovative product ideas. However, 
MakerHub realized makers will not be a core mechanism for quick, innovative product 
ideation or prototyping. Moreover, given its resource constraints and inability to 
exponentially go through R1’s feedback loop, MakerHub is attempting to maximize each 
engagement rather than maximize the number of engagements—focusing less on the 
quantity of stakeholders involved and more on those who provided greatest input toward 
product market validation. This relationship generates a balancing loop as the quantity of 
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information and feedback decreases but the quality increases (B4, See Figure 6). This 
development is potentially critical as through emphasizing stakeholder closeness, 
MakerHub may fulfill part of its initial purpose by capturing innovative product ideas from 
external inputs, distinguishing itself from Products Inc.’s R&D Centers. 
Summary. The new small appliances division alleviated many of MakerHub’s selling and 
marketing activities, enabling MakerHub to refocus toward community logics, 
demonstrated through MakerHub’s emphasis on physical engagement and their hiring a 
relations specialist. Moreover, the shift in activities also lessoned the centrality of corporate 
logics with MakerHub’s daily activities.  
Summarizing MakerHub’s Evolution 
At the outset of this chapter, I stated the following research question: If the end 
goals (explorative innovation) are accomplished primarily by internal knowledge capital 
(Products Inc. and MakerHub engineers), why does an organization with limited resources 
end up with two R&D organizations? This section attempts to identify MakerHub’s critical 
loops determining the overall system and to summarize how MakerHub’s product 
development system caused MakerHub, founded as a distinct entity, to more closely reflect 
Products Inc.’s R&D capabilities and practices.  
Critical Loop. Weick suggests one way to determine a system’s outcome is to identify its 
critical loop (assuming loops are of unequal importance); if the loop is a reinforcing loop 
(deviation-amplifying), the system will likely collapse, and if the system is a negative 
balancing loop (deviation-counteracting), the system will likely stabilize (Weick, 1979). 
One means of identifying the critical loop is by counting the inputs and outputs for each 
element and then determining which loop includes elements with the most inputs and 
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outputs (Weick, 1979). Product Market Validation contains six inputs and outputs. While 
no dimensions have five, three dimensions have four inputs and outputs: Scope of 
Ambition, Number of Stakeholders, and Awareness of Execution Problems. This suggests 
either R2 or B1 is the critical loop as both loops contain three of the four dimensions, but 
neither contain all four, so using this method of determining the system’s fate appears 
inconclusive.  
 If loops are assumed to hold equal importance in the system, Weick suggests a 
second strategy may be useful in determining the system’s fate. This method involves 
counting the number of negative loops: “By a negative loop we mean a closed loop that 
contains an odd number of negative causal relationships. We would predict that any system 
will survive as a system only if it contains an odd number of these negative loops” (Weick, 
1979, p. 76). According to this strategy, MakerHub has a deviation-amplifying system 
(even number of negative loops), suggesting its system is unstable. Problematically, 
though, the data does not support the idea that MakerHub’s loops hold equal importance.  
In an effort to discern the core of MakerHub’s system, I consider two competing 
goals that have, at one time or another during its history, driven MakerHub’s decision 
making: profit or innovation. Below, I consider how these goals interacted with product 
market validation—the dimension with most inputs and outputs. 
Finite Resources Constrained Innovation. MakerHub was built on the idea R1 
represents; build and validate, which leads to additional building and validating. However, 
MakerHub has a finite number of resources; therefore, as MakerHub proceeds through R1 
and R2, generating more builds, available resources to allocate to new active builds 
decreases. Balancing loop B1 regulates MakerHub’s overall scope of ambition as 
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MakerHub’s awareness of execution problems and actions to solve those problems entail 
an understanding of what is technically and operationally feasible given the resources 
available, consequently decreasing the rate at which MakerHub can proceed through R1 
and R2. At founding, an important distinction between MakerHub and Products Inc.’s 
R&D was the speed at which the build process occurred; however, B1’s regulation slowed 
R1 and R2 processes, decreasing MakerHub’s overall distinctness from Products Inc.’s 
R&D.  
Execution Problems Constrained Innovation. At founding, and in contrast to Products 
Inc.’s R&D Centers, MakerHub’s cognitive scope was intended to be broad, enabling 
innovative product ideas across product lines or even appliance size. However, over time, 
MakerHub’s cognitive scope became more constrained. Innovative product ideas generate 
additional stakeholders and additional execution problems—problems that further decrease 
speed. Consequently, B2 regulates R1 and R2 as MakerHub’s understanding of execution 
problems coupled with the potential publicity of those problems demotivates higher-risk 
product ideas.  
Developing Commercial Capabilities Constrained Innovation. Balancing loop B3 
further regulates MakerHub’s overall scope of ambition and the speed at which MakerHub 
can proceed through R1 and R2, decreasing the number of products validated. After 
Product 3’s successful market validation, MakerHub leadership attempted to hand it off to 
Products Inc.; however, Products Inc.’s leadership refused. One interviewee recalled, 
We'd said this place existed so that we can validate something and then 
when we validated it, they’d (Products Inc.) take it. And they wouldn't take 
it. We had the meeting with everyone all the way up to the CEO, and it was 
decided, “We (Products Inc.) don't know what to do with this. We can't do 
anything with it. So, you guys (MakerHub) are going to own it.” . . .  It 
didn't make sense for the guy who was responsible for sales to take one of 
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the salespeople who could generate 100 million dollars in sales and have 
them spend all their time developing a market for something that may sell 
another 3 or 4 million dollars next year. (2018-12-12_I). 
 
Consequently, MakerHub developed capabilities it was not initially designed for, 
specifically extensive sales activities geared toward broader markets and sales channels. 
To more effectively navigate both sales practices and customer engagement, MakerHub 
implemented protocols, increasing the firm’s bureaucracy. These activities also increased 
the need for more central decision making as more consequential, far reaching relationships 
developed. Collectively, balancing loops B1, B2, and B3 regulate MakerHub’s ability to 
quickly build and validate as resources were allocated away from validating products to 
commercial activities; execution problems further demotivated MakerHub’s ambition 
slowing R1 processes. 
Product 3’s continued success (including accessory products) required additional 
resources and capabilities around sales and marketing activities (B1 and B3), decreasing 
overall resources focused toward generating novel product ideas further decreasing speed 
through R1 and R2 processes. Product 3’s success and profitability forced MakerHub to 
consider competing realities: 1) there is a limited number of resources, 2) the number of 
products that can be potentially prototyped is much larger than the number of products that 
can be potentially sold, 3) Product 3 accessory products (and similar types of products) are 
faster, cheaper, and lower risk to develop; therefore, 4) is the goal profit or innovation?  
Slowing R1 and R2 to Develop Innovation and Maximize Profit.  As described earlier, 
Product 4’s unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign coincides with an increase in risk-averse 
decision making, generating a process learning emphasis. A consequence of limited 
resources, competing goals (e.g. innovative or profitable), and a desire to avoid future 
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mistakes was that MakerHub’s scope of ambition became bifurcated toward two types of 
products: either innovative, technology infused, high-risk products or non-innovative, low 
technology infused, low-risk products. Low technology products were low cost, faster to 
prototype, and required fewer resources to validate. Moreover, a number of low risk 
products (particularly Product 3 accessory products) were “hacks” created by consumers 
and suggested back to MakerHub. Examples include a product enabling an increase in 
capacity and a cleaning kit for Product 3. MakerHub validated and continues to validate 
many of these types of products through crowdfunding campaigns held on its website. They 
launch small batches, generally ten units, as “tests” to see if consumers purchase them, and 
MakerHub has launched several low technology products this way. 
Conversely, higher risk, innovative products are assigned two or three engineers. 
The engineers are tasked with developing the technology and building the product in a way 
Products Inc. could incorporate into its manufacturing capabilities and sell at a high margin. 
Core value propositions, product feature sets, and price points have all proved challenging 
in this process. When I once asked the commercial team about their process for identifying 
answers to these questions, I was told “we are a pretty good representatives of our customer 
base.” However, consensus is rarely quick, and several engineers confided their frustrations 
over not knowing what features to include and exclude in the product. These challenges 
slow product development and market validation (R1 and R2). For example, in my notes 
concerning one product under development, I wrote,  
Seems like a merry-go-round between software, hardware and marketing. 
The software component say they need to know what the [product] will have 
so they can write the code. The hardware people say they need to know what 
consumers want before they can fully develop the product. The marketing 
people say they need to know what wow factors the [product] will have so 
they can write a compelling story for the crowdfunding campaign. Nobody 
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knows what price point will sell best and what features will set the product 
apart. (2017-11-29_O) 
 
MakerHub attempts to maintain its image of quickly building and validating products by 
generating low technology products often with external inputs (such as consumers or 
student groups). Their image of being an innovative company is sustained through long-
term, high-risk products that may or may not ever be handed off to Products Inc. 
Further slowing down innovative products’ validation is an increase in overall 
bureaucracy, generated by both the success of Product 3 and the failure of Product 4. Also, 
MakerHub generates much of its own technology for its current, highly innovative products 
under development rather than its initial practice of utilizing existing technology at 
Products Inc., further decreasing speed from prototype to validation.  
Stakeholders as a Mechanism for Innovation. One of MakerHub’s founding 
assumptions was that by engaging with makers and enthusiasts, they could quickly 
prototype and validate innovative products, increasing MakerHub’s process through R1. 
This assumption is evident through MakerHub’s founding components (physical 
environment, cognitive scope, relational access, and level of formality), through their initial 
digital marketing strategy (e.g. maker focused), through the metrics established (e.g. 
develop twelve new products a year), through Product 1’s target market (makers), and 
through the overwhelming response by diverse stakeholder groups.  
Although Product 1 created excitement within the maker community, Product 2 
targeted a broader customer segment, demonstrated by the type of product itself (required 
no coding or “hacking”), the increase in price point, and the product’s overall success (sold 
more units). Product 2’s development also challenged one of MakerHub’s core 
assumptions, namely that makers were going to engage in the product development 
104 
 
process. The design challenge demonstrated interest in aesthetic collaboration, but 
MakerHub was less successful enticing makers into the physical building. This lack of 
relational success coupled with MakerHub’s increasing profitability led to relationships 
with external inputs becoming more symbolic rather than substantive.  
However, Products Inc.’s new division reduced MakerHub’s need for sales and 
marketing capabilities, causing a decrease in overall activities and a refocus on external 
inputs. A key difference is the emphasis on stakeholder closeness (e.g. quality of 
engagement) rather than overall quantity. This shift in focus is significant as previous 
quotes, actions, and interpretations demonstrate that makers were not prevalent in the 
ideation or building of products. Designers were the primary source of external input and 
were utilized through design challenges.  
Increased bureaucracy, increased risk aversion, and the lack of external input 
generated a profit focused organization similar in many ways to Products Inc.’s R&D 
centers. However, the recent founding of the new division may enable MakerHub to return 
to its build-validate emphasis, generating more innovative products. Also, MakerHub’s 
renewed efforts to foster high-quality engagements with key stakeholders in the 
development process may increase the speed through which MakerHub can build and 
validate. 
Overall Outcomes: Given MakerHub’s resource constraints, an innovation focused 
system would likely only survive if commercial activities were executed elsewhere and 
different metrics were used to evaluate MakerHub’s output. Innovation is messy and 
unpredictable. Metrics such as developing 12 products a year or financially breaking-even 
are inherent contradictions to developing innovative products, particularly if products 
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require advanced technological development. The new division enables this type of 
innovation focus. However, an innovation focused system also requires a key change in 
rationalizing successes and failures, a change from corporate and professional logics back 
to a startup logic. Otherwise, an organization focused on developing innovative products 
will be little different than Products Inc.’s current R&D Centers. 
 As describe throughout this study, a profit focused system governed much of 
MakerHub’s decisions post-Product 3’s development. To satisfy the break-even and 12 
products-a-year metrics, MakerHub pursued accessory products that were profitable, 
quickly produced, and low risk. A combination of corporate and professional logics meant 
protocols were developed to enable efficiency, safety, and avoidance of future mistakes. 
However, when MakerHub was driven by a profit motive, concerns were raised over its 
contribution to Products Inc. Profits were never MakerHub’s purpose as the initial goal and 
logic driving MakerHub’s design was to validate innovative product ideas.  
Benefits and Drawbacks for MakerHub Existing 
Benefits. In many ways, MakerHub evolved away from its startup logics and initial mission 
to embrace risk by failing-fast and creating radically innovative products through maker 
engagement. Product 3’s success necessitated bureaucratizing MakerHub. Product 4’s 
failure exacerbated the new leadership coalition’s reliance on professional and corporate 
logics, which consequently led to an increase on learning from failure rather than 
embracing its founding notion of failing fast and moving on. The increased emphasis on 
process learning further increased bureaucracy. There are, however, a number of important 
ways in which MakerHub still helps contribute to Products Inc. 
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First, MakerHub is a physical place in which innovative ideas can occur and be 
prototyped. MakerHub recently hosted a Products Inc. hackathon for Products Inc. 
engineers (2019-2-21_O). This nuanced type of internal “innovation tournament” is 
consistent with other recent strategies large corporations are undertaking to maximize 
employee innovation (Tersiesch & Ulrich, 2009). Moreover, MakerHub is getting 
progressively better at identifying the types of individuals who are most useful in 
developing truly innovative ideas and the means through which to engage those 
individuals. MakerHub’s development of internal (employee hackathons) and external 
(events or practices targeted to specific groups) mechanisms designed to capture high 
quality, innovative ideas and expertise is forward looking, particularly within its own 
industry.  
Second, MakerHub small batch manufacturing capabilities are beneficial to 
Products Inc. Like auto manufacturers, Products Inc.’s facilities are designed for producing 
thousands of units. MakerHub’s small batch manufacturing capabilities enable 
customization, design changes, and product “hacking” without shutting down large scale 
operations. Such capabilities are particularly useful when questions are raised about how a 
product might modified or enhanced with additional features. MakerHub can “slap” 
something together to quickly “see if it works” and discover what potential problems may 
arise in larger scale operations. 
A third way in which MakerHub benefits Products Inc. is by developing different 
mechanisms for engaging with consumers and their opinions, particularly around product 
desirability and product features. Surveys are as easy as “thumbs up or thumbs down” type 
questions on Facebook. MakerHub is constantly experimenting on how to better engage 
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with consumers and reduce the potential barriers (time, access, complexity) for consumers 
to engage with them. These experiments are important as consumer engagement and 
feedback are problems many corporations are attempting to figure out.  
Finally, MakerHub benefits Products Inc. by serving as a mechanism for good will 
and external engagement. Whereas Product Inc.’s imposing corporate campus is 
inaccessible to the community, MakerHub is a friendly environment in which enthusiasts, 
makers, or consumers can engage. Large corporations’ brand image is become increasing 
known through social media, which has led to digital strategies to appear friendly or 
innovative. MakerHub generates a wonderful external image for Products Inc., which is 
further demonstrated by the amount of positive press both locally and nationally.    
Drawbacks. Part of MakerHub’s founding stipulation with Products Inc. was that it would 
pay for itself. Product 3’s success enabled several years of operating in the black; however, 
other products have not attained the same level of success. Highly innovative products are 
inherently risky; therefore, how will MakerHub financially sustain itself, particularly if its 
most successful products are sold through Products Inc. new division? If MakerHub is not 
able to demonstrate that increased closeness with stakeholders generates innovative 
product ideas and increases speed through the product validation process, then MakerHub 
may merely become an expensive R&D center, providing intangible benefits to the 
community (open makerspace symbolic of community’s innovation) and a physical 
environment for Products Inc.’s employees to quickly “hack” an idea. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 In this chapter, I articulate the theoretical contributions of this study, practical 
implications, areas for future research, limitations, and offer a conclusion.  
Theoretical Contributions 
 This study makes several contributions. First, Products Inc.’s attempt to respond to 
market pressures by launching MakerHub provides insights into how ventures founded to 
be dissimilar from the parent form and evolve. Past research demonstrates firms can evolve 
for many reasons, including external pressures and managerial changes among others 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). Less research examines the impact product outcomes have on 
the formation, development, and evolution of firm logics. MakerHub’s story contributes to 
our understanding (of the phenomenon) by demonstrating how success (Product 3), 
necessity (production capabilities for Product 3), failure (Product 4), and an exogenous 
shock (new division) may interact to produce a new ordering of logics that differs from 
that at founding and more similar to what is familiar (e.g. Products Inc.’s R&D Centers). 
These findings suggest both firms’ need for additional logics and rationalization of 
incumbent logics may evolve in both intended and unintended ways.  
Related to the first, this study’s second contribution suggests a cluster of competing 
logics may act as both structural constraints and agency enablers as outputs or needs vary, 
causing logics’ salience to ebb and flow. Although a few studies examine the micro-
processes demonstrating firms’ and individuals’ responses to competing logics (Smets et 
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al., 2012), little is known about how individuals respond within new ventures. MakerHub’s 
story highlights the constraining role of certain logics vis-a-vis the enabling function of 
still other logics within a new venture. Product 3’s unexpected success combined with 
Products Inc.’s lack of ability to take on Product 3 “forced” MakerHub to adopt a logic 
which could enable maximum performance (corporate logic). Adopting a corporate logic 
subsequently focused MakerHub’s resources, constraining its ability to maintain startup 
logics. When Products Inc. launched a new division, the need for a corporate logic 
decreased. Although MakerHub retains aspects of a corporate logic, maximizing product 
exposure (e.g. marketing spending) is no longer emphasized. In this study, four logics are 
apparent within MakerHub and their competing prescriptions are demonstrated through the 
negotiations between and actions by employees and management. As MakerHub evolved, 
developed capabilities, and increased its bureaucracy, competing prescriptions generated a 
reordering of logics. However, all four logics remained as MakerHub continued to satisfy 
each of its distinct stakeholder groups. 
MakerHub retained all four logics by utilizing key phrases broadly thereby 
compartmentalizing certain logics through “symbolic commitment” (Greenwood et al., 
2011, p. 30). For example, over time “co-create” and “community” became all-
encompassing words that could mean any engagement at any stage in the product 
development process. Therefore, MakerHub could emphasize both its community logic and 
corporate logic simultaneously without making an explicit tradeoff. Through maintaining 
a certain level of ambiguity, MakerHub retained the identities diverse stakeholder groups 
wanted it to have.  
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This study’s third contribution relates to how rationalizing past actions and 
outcomes impact product development decisions, particularly depending on the 
management’s risk averse tendencies. Logics not only prescribe action, but also serve to 
make sense of what, how, and why outcomes occur. My findings suggest greater nuance in 
how logics are negotiated, sustained, and replaced even when firm outcomes are internally 
consistent with the incumbent set of logics’ prescriptions. In other words, even when ‘what, 
how, and why’ were consistently explained within the startup logic rationalization, that 
logic was replaced in exchange for a more comfortable known logic. For example, whereas 
a startup logic was used to rationalize Product 1 and 2’s success, a corporate logic formed 
both the strategy for Product 3 and rationalized its success. Conversely, a professional logic 
rationalized Product 4’s failure, increasing risk aversion tendencies and generating 
significant rippling effects for future decision making. This suggests a logic may 
sufficiently explain outcomes yet still be replaced.  
 Fourth, this study contributes to the growing theoretical interest in makerspaces and 
further explores one makerspace’s practical impact. Recent scholarship (Browder et al., 
2019) theorizes “knowledge creation and sharing spaces constitute the central features of 
the maker movement, creating resource combinations that makers can use for project 
execution, expansion, and—in some cases—commercialization.” MakerHub assumed its 
location, openness, and advanced fabrication capabilities would attract makers intent on 
commercial outcomes into its physical environment, generating innovative ideas between 
employees and individuals. With the exception of students working on class projects or 
Products Inc. employees, very few makers utilize use MakerHub’s technology or tools. 
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MakerHub is an open innovation organization. As noted earlier, open innovation is 
not a silver bullet for companies. Birkinshaw et al. (2011) warn companies are actually 
much better at internally generating innovative ideas than they are at selecting, developing, 
or diffusing those ideas. Moreover, they certify, “online tools, open innovation 
communities and big collaborative forums all have their limitations. None is always right 
or always wrong. The best approach involves careful judgment and a deep understanding 
of the particular challenges a company is facing” (Birkinshaw et al., 2011, p. 8). This study 
provides additional data to the conversation regarding what types of innovations corporate 
venture makerspaces actually generate. MakerHub’s innovative product ideas were 
generated internally; however, MakerHub had two sources of incremental innovations 
which were often more similar to the concept of “hacking” (a key element within the maker 
movement). MakerHub’s hacks are derived from two sources: 1) customers hacking add-
on solutions to products at home (e.g. increased capacity add-on to Product 3, probe 
incorporated for Product 2), and 2) MakerHub engineers hacking existing appliances, 
enabling unique applications (e.g. adding a credit card system to a large appliance).  
Browder and colleagues (2019) also question the extent to which external labor 
benefits from engaging with corporations on various projects. MakerHub navigates these 
potentially challenging waters by often celebrating consumer engagement through social 
media recognition. As the products being hacked by consumers are generally low tech and 
inexpensive, recognition appears sufficient as little resistance or objection is raised. 
Practical Implications 
 There are several practical implications of the present study. First, a corporate 
venture makerspace offers a new environment in which to study innovation, corporate 
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entrepreneurship, and product development. I hope my work offers insights for 
corporations wanting to develop innovative organizational designs with environments 
distinct from “corporate culture.” The notions of physical environment, cognitive scope, 
relational access, and cultural norms can be used as a means to create broad categories in 
which to clearly differentiate how an environment may be created distinct.  
A second implication for practitioners is the way in which MakerHub responds as 
new products flourish or flounder. Both successful and unsuccessful products impact the 
venture, particularly on firm bureaucracy and organizational outcomes. Successful 
products necessitate processes to enable the manufacturing, selling, and servicing of 
products and customers. Such processes can increase bureaucracy, which tends to slow 
organizations down. Moreover, if products are successful but the firm does not increase 
human capital, resources may become spread too thinly also decreasing the time and 
resources necessary to ideate and validate new product ideas. Similarly, unsuccessful 
products can also increase bureaucracy as management implements new processes to avoid 
failure in the future. As demonstrated in the case of MakerHub, “management got PTSD” 
from the failure of Product 4 instead of celebrating having learned something and moving 
on. Developing such a risk accepting environment may prove challenging, particularly for 
professional disciplines that emphasize safety and efficiency (e.g. engineering).  
 As a third practical implication, this study provides an example of a corporate 
venture navigating between corporate, community, and venture stakeholders. Over time, 
MakerHub evolved in how it managed each of these relationships to both better serve its 
own purpose as well as maintain value for its diverse set of stakeholder groups. MakerHub 
accomplished this goal by emphasizing both the physical environment, bringing interested 
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parties into the space, as well as by emphasizing its employees’ relational access, enabling 
engagement with industry experts, makers, enthusiasts, and potential consumers. 
Limitations 
In this section, I discuss potential threats to external validity and limitations. First, 
MakerHub’s environment is unique. The location of MakerHub results in human capital, 
knowledge capital, and other resource constraints that are geographically specific. This 
study took place in a midsized city in the south-central U.S. It is impossible to determine 
whether the results of this study would be consistent with a study on either U.S. coast. A 
second threat to external validity is that MakerHub is situation specific. Indeed, a limitation 
of case study analysis is lack of generalizability given the small sample size, and in this 
particular case, the sample size of 1. However, MakerHub is unique as it is the only 
corporate venture makerspace I know of, making additional case studies of similar 
organizational type firms impossible. Moreover, given both the intense national interest in 
MakerHub (evidenced by publications in the Wall Street Journal, Harvard Business 
Review and others) and the growing trend in large corporations to adopt innovative 
strategies, MakerHub’s story is potentially relevant to a wide audience of firms and 
managers. Although MakerHub’s environment is distinct from other firms, I contend 
enough similarities exist to generate relevance to other firms and managers. 
 There are several limitations to the present study. For example, Products Inc. is in 
the appliances industry. A corporate venture like MakerHub may not be as effective in a 
more technologically driven industry or in one significantly less technologically driven. 
Part of MakerHub’s appeal to both community members and customers is MakerHub’s 
involvement in new technology development. However, if Products Inc. was in a 
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technology industry (i.e. software), MakerHub might have had greater difficulty in 
separating identities from the parent (Products Inc.). Conversely, if Products Inc. had no 
technological component, MakerHub’s innovative processes might have been 
underwhelming, causing stakeholders to dismiss the innovative aspects of MakerHub that 
generates interest from internal and external stakeholders.  
 Lastly, a further limitation concerns the interviews conducted. I did not interview 
current members of Products Inc. as this is not a comparative ethnography and many of the 
MakerHub employees are former Products Inc. employees.  
Future Research 
 With a few notable exceptions (Biniari et al., 2015; Pahnke et al., 2015), very little 
institutional logics research discusses the parent-venture relationship. There are number of 
potential avenues for further study in this research stream. For example, when a parent 
spawns a venture with a different logic, understanding the conditions under which the logic 
remains or fades is significant. What types of hybrids generate the most successful 
corporate ventures? Under what conditions do geographical distance between parent and 
venture impact the likelihood of a founding set of logics remain or change? To what extent 
does hiring non-corporate employees to run the venture impact founding logics? How 
important are significant successes or significant failures in the likelihood a venture logic 
stays? Are moderate product successes and moderate failures less causal in logic changes 
or tensions than significant successes or failures? Such questions are potentially important 
as firms continue to experiment with various organizational types in an effort to generate 
sustainable innovation practices.   
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 A second area for future research concerns the relationship between employee and 
institutional complexity. Past research highlights the impact changes in logics may have 
on employee satisfaction (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). For example, one study discusses 
the disillusionment that socially focused employees had when a social venture business 
became more profit focused (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). In a different study, researchers 
demonstrate how new hires were frustrated when they realized the firm logics presented to 
them in interviews were different than the logics emphasized in everyday firm practices. 
MakerHub provides a unique example. Even when logics shifted dramatically from startup 
logics to corporate and professional logics, employees remained relatively happy. 
Although some commercial employees became frustrated as MakerHub returned to a more 
product development focus away from maximizing profits, even those employees enjoy 
the overall environment and culture at MakerHub. 
Conclusion 
Although several of its founding assumptions were not realized—namely the level 
of external maker engagement in generating innovative product ideas or the ability to 
validate innovative products quickly—MakerHub’s past successes include several 
profitable products, national recognition and attention, appreciation by many local 
stakeholders, and multiple awards for best product in its category at major technology 
conferences. MakerHub’s team is talented and enthusiastic. To date, however, MakerHub’s 
greatest innovation is not one of its products. MakerHub’s greatest innovation is MakerHub 
itself. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Warm up/ Generative Questions 
1. Why did you come to MakerHub? 
2. Tell me about your favorite project at MakerHub. 
 
Fundamental Assumption 
3. Before asking my other questions, I would like to confirm your understanding of 
MakerHub’s mission and strategy. I will state my understanding, please correct 
me if you think I am wrong. 
 
MakerHub was designed to (A) quickly prototype never-seen-before products by 
(B) engaging with the community through drawing on their ideas and feedback, 
(C) being separate from Products Inc. so that MakerHub could be more free to 
prototype innovative product ideas, but (D) to still be a part of Products Inc., so 
that you could manufacture and develop profitable innovations. Is that correct? 
a. If yes, Thank you, I would like to ask you about each element of this 
mission and strategy. The questions are designed to examine how each 
element of this strategy interacts with each other element, as thoroughly as 
possible. Therefore, some parts may seem highly detailed or may seem to 
overlap with other parts. Thus, if you feel like you have nothing to say in 
response to a given question that is fine. Please just let me know and we 
will move on to the next question. 
b. If no, ask for clarification and changes. Adapt the subsequent questions 
accordingly. 
 
Community Engagement  
4. In your past experience, what have been some activities you do to engage the 
community?  
5. How do these community activities influence your ability to prototype innovative 
product ideas? 
 
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your community related 
activities help or hinder your ability to prototype innovative product ideas 
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely 
helped 
 
6. How do these community related activities influence MakerHub’s or Products 
Inc.’s ability to manufacture and sell new products? 
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Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your community related 
activities help or hinder MakerHub’s or Products Inc.’s ability to manufacture and sell 
new products.  
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely 
helped 
 
Internal Activities that Enable/Constrain 
7. In your past experience, what have been some activities you have done to 
prototype innovative product ideas?  
8. How do these activities to prototype innovative product ideas influence 
MakerHub’s or Products Inc.’s ability to manufacture and sell new products? 
 
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to 
prototype innovative product ideas help or hinder MakerHub’s or Products Inc.’s ability 
to manufacture and sell new products.  
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely 
helped 
 
9. How do these activities you do to prototype innovative product ideas influence 
how you interact with the community? 
  
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to 
prototype innovative product ideas help or hinder your ability to engage with the 
community 
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely 
helped 
 
10. In your past experience, what are some activities you do at MakerHub to 
manufacture products and make money?   
 
11. How do these activities to manufacture products and make money influence your 
ability to interact with the community?  
 
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to 
manufacture products and make money help or hinder your ability to interact with the 
community.  
(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely 
helped 
 
12. How do these activities you do to manufacture products and make money 
influence your ability to prototype innovative product ideas?  
 
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of your activities to 
manufacture products and make money help or hinder your ability to prototype 
innovative product ideas 
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(1) Extremely hindered (2) Somewhat hindered (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat helped (5) Extremely 
helped 
  
Triangulation/Validation Question 
13. I will show interviewees the list of activities generated from my field notes, and 
my ideas about how they would answer the questions above, given the field notes. 
I will ask interviewees to respond to both the activities listed and then state what 
they agree with, what they disagree with, and why they agree or disagree. 
 
MakerHub in the Future Questions 
14. Where do you think MakerHub will be in 5 years? 
15. What do you hope MakerHub looks like in 5 years  
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